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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




RIQO M. PEREA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20100891-SC 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for two counts of Aggravated Murder in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202, two counts of Attempted Murder in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 and a Dangerous Weapon Enhancement in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-203 in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, 
Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's ability to present his 
defense by limiting an expert's testimony on crime scene reconstruction. 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's decision to exclude expert witness 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. 
& Med. Ctr, 2010 UT 59, \ 5, 242 P.3d 762; State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 
% 6, 223 P.3d 1103. This Court will "disturb the district court's decision to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
strike expert testimony only when it exceeds the limits of reasonability." 
Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, \ 5 (quoting State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 34, ^ 66, 44 
P.3d 794) (internal quotations omitted). 
b. Preservation of the Argument. The State initially filed a motion asking to 
exclude the expert's testimony. R. 1039, 1279. The defendant also filed a 
motion to arrest judgment and a motion for new trial, which in both, he 
asserted a violation. R. 1478, 1563, 1570. 
II. Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony of defense expert 
Richard G. Ofshe, an expert in false confessions. 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's decision to exclude expert witness 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See La of this section. 
b. Preservation of the Argument. The State filed a motion in limine asking the 
trial court to exclude Dr. Ofshe's testimony. R. 1064. Defendant opposed 
the motion. R. 1171. The defendant also filed a motion to arrest judgment 
and a motion for new trial, which in both, he asserted a violation. R. 1478, 
1563, 1570. 
III. Whether this Court should require recording of police interrogations that occur at 
police stations. 
a. Standard of Review. A constitutional interpretation constitutes a question of 
law that this Court reviews for correctness, affording no deference to the 
trial court. See, e.g., State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, f 8, 232 P.3d 519 
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(interpreting state and federal constitutions); Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, ^ 
6, 18, 199 P.3d 892; Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, \ 19, 102 P.3d 774 
(interpreting federal constitution), 
b. Preservation of the Argument. Defense counsel's motion to suppress the 
confession alleged that the failure to record the confession violated 
defendant's right to due process. See R. 363, 256. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Perea's motion to suppress his 
confession for a Miranda violation. 
a. Standard of Review. This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant a 
motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992). This court reviews the factual findings in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's decision but reviews questions of law 
under a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 (Utah 1991). 
b. Preservation of the Argument. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
confession. See R. 363, 256. 
V. Whether the trial court erroneously failed to allow critical defense witnesses to 
testify anonymously in order to protect them from gang retaliation. 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's decision as to whether witnesses 
deserved to testify anonymously or in camera constitutes a mixed question. 
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State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Additionally, since this issue 
affected the defendant's right to due process and to present exculpatory 
evidence, the mixed standard also applies. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f 35, 
152P.3d32L 
b. Preservation of the Argument. The defendant formally moved that the trial 
court allow defense witnesses to testify anonymously. R. 733. 
VI. Whether an imposition of life without parole, for a nineteen-year-old with an IQ of 
77 violates the United States and Utah Constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, and whether Utah's life without parole statute violates guarantees of equal 
protection and due process. 
a. Standard of Review. A constitutional interpretation is a question of law that 
this Court reviews for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. 
See, e.g., State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, t 8, 232 P.3d 519; Ford v. State, 2008 
UT 66, ffif 6, 18, 199 P.3d 892. However, underlying factual determinations 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932 (Utah 1994); State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, Tf 35, 152 P.3d 321. 
b. Preservation of the Argument. Defense counsel filed a motion challenging 
the constitutionality of the life without parole statute as applied to Mr. 
Perea.R. 1480, 1500, 1550. 
VII. Whether the combination of the above errors and other unraised errors constitutes 
cumulative error. 
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a. Standard of Review. A cumulative error claim requires the court to apply 
"the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of error." 
Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, \ 4, 172 P.3d 668. "Under 
the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if 'the cumulative effect 
of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
b. Preservation of the Argument. The defendant also filed a motion to arrest 
judgment and a motion for new trial, which in both, he asserted several 
violations. R. 1478, 1563, 1570. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. IV, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art. 
I §§ 9, 12, 14, 24, Utah R. Crim. Pro. 12, 22, 40; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 16, 2007, the State charged the defendant by information with two 
counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder and a dangerous penalty 
enhancement. R. 5. On January 8, 2008, the State filed notice of its intent to seek the 
death penalty. R. 63. On March 9, 2010 through March 16,2010, the case was tried to a 
jury and on March 16, 2010, the jury found the defendant guilty of all five counts of the 
information. R. 1375-84. On May 25, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to arrest 
judgment. R. 1478, 1563. On May 27, 2010, the defendant was sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole. R. 1566. On June 2, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for new 
5 
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trial. R. 1570. On October 7, 2010, the court orally denied the motion for new trial. R. 
1872. On October 29, 2010, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 1874. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because Mr. Perea raises several issues, the facts relevant to those issues will be 
summarized in their appropriate sections. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court held, pretrial, that the defense expert would be allowed to 
present his theory, and that flaws in his testimony went to its weight. Mid-trial, in 
response to a last-minute State motion, the trial court abruptly, and erroneously, changed 
its decision and prohibited the defense's forensic scientist from presenting any 
demonstrative exhibits. The trial court's ruling unconstitutionally denied the defendant 
the most persuasive evidence of his innocence. Additionally, the court unconstitutionally 
prohibited the defense expert from contradicting the State's witnesses. Finally, the trial 
court allowed the State to rebut the defense expert with its own charts and to comment on 
the defense expert's testimony, effectively expressing a preference for the State's case 
and theory. 
Point II: The trial court; prohibited the defense from presenting expert testimony 
surrounding false confessions, particularly the strong possibility that Riqo falsely 
confessed to this offense. However, the scientific literature repeatedly supports the 
proposition that people falsely confess to crimes, that juries are not aware of the 
phenomenon, and that juries tend to overvalue confessions. Expert testimony has 
6 
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repeatedly been held to be critical to help establish a claim of a false confession and the 
trial court erroneously deprived the defense of the opportunity to present this evidence. 
Point HI: This Court has previously ruled that the Constitution does not require 
police officers to record confessions, reasoning that confessions may be taken outside of 
a police station. However, in this case, officers took Riqo's confession in a room in which 
recording would have been as simple as pressing a button, but the officers deliberately 
and consciously chose not to press record. This Court should require the police to record 
confessions, particularly when they occur at police stations since it deprived this Court of 
critical evidence necessary to assess the voluntariness of Riqo's confession. 
Point IV: The defendant clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to deal with 
the police in interrogation only with the assistance of counsel, although he was not in 
custody at the time of the invocation. A defendant can anticipatorily invoke his right to 
counsel and the police were duty bound to honor the defendant's request. Hence, the trial 
court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the confession. 
Point V: Witnesses approached defense counsel willing to testify that a person 
other than Riqo Perea did the shooting at issue in this case, but that they feared for their 
safety and wished to testify anonymously. The trial court failed to take necessary steps to 
protect these witnesses, and in fact ordered the defense to disclose their names so that law 
enforcement could conduct a full investigation. The trial court erroneously took steps that 
ensured these witnesses would not cooperate with the court or with defense counsel, 
ultimately resulting in the loss of critical defense testimony. 
7 
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Point VI: The Utah and United States Constitutions prohibit sentencing a 19-year 
with an IQ of 77 and various mental illnesses to the punishment of life without parole, as 
it is cruel and unusual and in violation of unnecessary rigor. Additionally, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutionally vague since it gives no discretion to the court and 
denies a defendant proper due process by removing the sentencing decision from the jury. 
Point VII: The combination of errors in this case resulted in cumulative error, 
when taken together. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED PART OF THE 
TESTIMONY OF JAMES GASKILL 
The State moved pretrial to exclude the testimony of the defendant's expert, James 
Gaskill, a retired professor of criminal justice at Weber State University, who concluded 
that there were multiple shooters and that the forensic evidence did not justify many of 
the State's conclusions. R. 1039-41; 1917:28-32. Gaskill had extensive experience in 
forensics, having testified in over 2,000 trials in all but one of Utah's counties. R. 
1926:158-59. The court denied the State's motion, reasoning that the professor's methods 
went to the weight of his testimony and not to its substance. R. 1917:38-39. The court 
also ruled that the professor's conclusions could contradict witness testimony, but that he 
could not openly comment on the credibility of a witness. R. 1690-91; 1917:39-40. 
Ten minutes before the defendant began his case, the State gave both counsel and 
the court a motion again asking to exclude GaskilPs testimony. R. 1926:137, 150. The 
trial court complained that the State "literally dumpfed] this in my lap in the middle of 
8 
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the trial" and that this put the court "in a box" of having to assess something that should 
have been done pretrial. R. 1926:139, 141, 145, 155. 
Gaskill testified that he went to the scene, took measurements and photographs, 
read police reports, and listened to witness testimony in reaching his conclusions. R. 
1926:161-62. He also directed a computer specialist to prepare an animation depicting his 
testimony. R. 1926:163-66. He testified that the animation and photographs "accurately 
reflect what [he] intended them to reflect." R. 1926:176-77. After this testimony, the trial 
court changed its ruling and prohibited Gaskill from using the animation, reasoning that 
Gaskill could not lay a foundation for its admissibility since he did not prepare it himself. 
R. 1926:181-82. The court allowed Gaskill to testify to much of his theory—however, 
every time the professor's testimony contradicted that of another witness, the court 
sustained the State's objections on the grounds that it constituted commentary "on the 
credibility of witnesses ...." R. 1926:186-87; 191-95. Gaskill was able to testify that he 
believed there were multiple shooters (including one in the yard or carport), that the 
bullet casing pattern did not seem consistent with the State's version of events, that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a shooter to hit these victims according to the 
State's theory. R. 1926:189-93, 200-01, 204-10; 223, 225. The court also prohibited 
Gaskill from putting individual locations on a demonstrative map because Gaskill lacked 
the knowledge to know "exactly where they were." R. 1926:218, 208-09. The animation, 
as proffered by defense counsel, would have demonstrated to the jury how two of the 
victims were shot by another individual in the yard or carport. R. 1927:153-54. 
9 
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In rebuttal, the court allowed the State's expert to use a demonstrative exhibit, 
admittedly drawn not to scale, depicting bullet trajectories consistent with its theory. R. 
1927:58, 1928:8. The defense objected, since the court would not allow its expert to use 
demonstrative exhibits, but the court overruled the objection. R. 1927:58. The State's 
expert, unlike Mr. Gaskill, had never been to the scene, nor taken any measurements. R. 
1927:67. 
The trial court's abrupt about-face effectively gutted the most effective pieces of 
the defendant's case.1 The defense expert was erroneously prohibited from introducing 
any demonstrative exhibits and was unconstitutionally prohibited from presenting science 
that contradicted the State's witnesses' versions of the shooting. 
Computer Generated Animation, Courts have frequently allowed the use of 
computer-generated reconstructions to assist expert testimony. See State v. Phillips, 98 
P.3d 838, 843 (Wash. App. 2004) (holding that an expert's testimony should not be 
limited merely because he used a computer reconstruction; challenges to the software 
goes to its weight, not admissibility); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 812-13 (Ohio App. 
1995) ("the fact that other jurisdictions ... allow for the admission of computer-generated 
simulations or reconstructions speaks for the reliability of such simulations within the 
relevant technical community"). 
1
 The court also denied defense motions regarding this evidence at the motion to arrest 
2
 The number of cases to allow computer reconstructions to supplement expert testimony 
is voluminous at best. See e.g., People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. 1984) 
(proper to admit computer simulation of car crash in manslaughter prosecution); United 
States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1972) (computer analysis used to 
10 
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There are two categories of computer generated animations [CGA]: 1) 
demonstrative and 2) substantive; each has different standards of admissibility. 
If an animation is used to illustrate a witness's testimony, it is purely 
demonstrative. One commentator called these "a graphic representation - a series of 
pictures 'drawn' by a computer operator with a computer - depicting a witness's 
testimony."3 On the other hand, if "data is entered into a computer which is programmed 
to analyze the information and perform calculations by applying mathematical models, 
laws of physics and other scientific principles in order to draw conclusions and recreate 
an incident" then the animation is substantive evidence. Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. 
D. & C.4th 52, 68 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001); Dean Morande, A Class of Their 
Own: Model Procedural Rules and Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer Generated 
Animations, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2007). With a substantive animation, the 
computer acts as an expert itself, a silent witness, and as such, the computer simulation 
must pass the tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence, such as Frye or Daubert. 
Morande, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 1073. 
However, demonstrative animations do not have to comply with the rules for 
scientific admissibility. See Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 901-03 (Ky. 2000) 
("because a computer-generated diagram, like any diagram, is merely illustrative of a 
determine when defendant would have exhausted his inventory had he not concealed 
assets). 
Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial 
Acceptance, 13 HARV. J . L . & T E C H . 161, 171-72 and 180-81 (2000). 
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witness's testimony, its admission normally does not depend on testimony as to how the 
diagram was prepared, e.g., how the data was gathered or inputted into the computer").4 
Typically, they must be authenticated—that the animation fairly and accurately depicts 
the proponent's version of the events; they must be relevant; and they must not be 
prejudicial See Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1178 (Pa. 2006); Harris v. 
Oklahoma, 13 P.3d 489 (Ok. Crim. 2000).5 The reasoning is that CGAs are more efficient 
and better tools, just like pen and paper have been, through which the expert can illustrate 
his testimony. Galves, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. at 181-83 & 189-90. 
A. The Court Unfairly Suppressed the Videotape By Allowing the State to 
Raise the Issue Mid-Trial. 
The first problem lies in the "surprise" motion filed by the State. Motions to suppress 
evidence "shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial." Utah R. Crim. Pro. 
12(c)(1)(B). The State waived this issue because it did not raise it pretrial. Cf Id. R. 12(f) 
(defendant's failure to raise a motion to suppress constitutes a waiver of the issue). 
4
 Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. App. 1999) (computer-generated 
animation, which merely illustrates the witness's testimony, is admissible if it is a fair 
and accurate representation of the scene sought to be depicted); See also Morande, 61 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1069; Dean M. Harts, Reel to Real: Should You Believe What You See, 66 
DEF. COUNS. J. 514, October 1999; Timothy W. Cerniglia, Computer-Generated 
Exhibits-Demonstrative, Substantive or Pedagogical-Their Place in Evidence, 18 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 1,1994 at 4-5. 
5
 See also A. Albrecht, Laying a Proper Foundation for Computer-Generated 
Demonstrative Evidence, 90 I I I . B.J. 261 (2002); Mary Elizabeth McGinnis Hadley, 
Access to CGAs and Justice: The Impact of the Use of Computer Generated Animations 
on Indigent Criminal Defendants1 Constitutional Rights, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 877, 
884 (Summer 2009). 
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"Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, timely and adequate notice and 
an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." McBride v. Utah State Bar, 2010 UT 
60, \ 16, 242 P.3d 769 (internal quotation marks omitted); Osburn v. Bott, 2011 UT App 
138, |^ 7, 681 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. "In our judicial system ... all parties are entitled to notice 
that a particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present 
evidence and argument on that issue before decision." Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 
(Utah 1990). 
While defense counsel had a few perfunctory responses, the court gave virtually 
no time to the defense to respond. The State asked the court if it would like time to read 
through the motion, noting that "it's a bit lengthy." R. 1926:137. Even the court 
complained that the State's motion was dropped on its lap in the middle of trial. R. 
1926:141. The defendant protested that he, too, had not read it. R. 1926:152. The court 
decided to see if Gaskill could lay adequate foundation. R. 1926:155. The State 
questioned the professor, the defense moved to admit the evidence and the court changed 
its pretrial ruling and prohibited the testimony. R. 1926:163-81. 
The problem in this procedure is the uncertainty engendered by the State's motion. 
This issue had been previously decided and ruled on by the court well before trial. Based 
on that ruling, the defense proceeded assuming Gaskill would be able to present his 
theory. The State's improperly filed motion, and the court's reversal of decision without 
giving the defense a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State's motion and 
memorandum, constitutes the kind of surprise that violates due process. 
13 
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Several policy reasons support resolving suppression issues pretrial.6 It allows all 
parties the comfort of knowing what evidence they have to work with during trial. It 
allows parties to prepare their cases and theories knowing full well what evidence the 
court has admitted or excluded. Because suppressed evidence may carry extraordinary 
weight, it may entirely affect a party's ability to present a case. For example, if the court 
excludes the evidence of the crime, the State may not be able to go forward. For the 
defense, an exclusion of evidence may completely eradicate his challenge to the case. 
Additionally, it allows each party and full and complete opportunity to brief the court. 
Additionally, parties must adhere to pretrial decisions. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 
189, 191 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Generally, a pretrial ruling on a suppression motion 
becomes the law of the case to be adhered to by the trial judge") (citing United States v. 
Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970); State v. Pope, 
224 N.W.2d 521 (1974); cf. State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 83 (Utah 1983) (Howe, J., 
6
 See e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980) (the 
requirement that motions to suppress be filed pretrial "is designed to eliminate from the 
trial disputes ... not immediately relevant to the question of guilt" and that the rule 
"carr[ies] out an important social policy and not a narrow, finicky procedural 
requirement."); Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111-112 (1927) (courts should 
not permit collateral matters to be raised mid-trial "except where there has been no 
opportunity to present the matter in advance of trial"); United States v. Gomez, 770 F.2d 
251 (1st Cir. 1985) (raising suppression issues at trial "impedes the momentum of the 
main proceeding and breaks the continuity of the jury's attention."); Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
16(a) (purpose behind pretrial hearings are to 1) expedite disposition; 2) establish "early 
and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted for lack of management"; 3) 
discourage wasteful pretrial activities; 4) improve the quality of trial preparation; 5) 
facilitate case settlement and 6) consider matters to help the disposition of the case). 
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concurring in result) (suggesting that all pretrial suppression rulings should be binding at 
trial)). 
The State's surprise motion effectively asked the court to redecide an issue it had 
already ruled on and not only caught the defense by surprise, but prevented the defense 
from effectively and meaningfully addressing and rebutting the State's arguments/ 
B. The Trial Court Erroneously Excluded the Animation and Photographs. 
The trial court also unfairly limited the professor's testimony when it ruled that he 
lacked the foundation to introduce animations and photographs. 
The Defense Presented Adequate Foundation to Admit the Exhibits. The trial 
court incorrectly reasoned that the animation and photographs were inadmissible for 
foundational reasons because demonstrative exhibits do not have this requirement. See 
Serge, 896 A.2d at 1178 n.4 ("CGA evidence has been admitted in most states that have 
considered the matter, including in the criminal context.") see also Galves, 13 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. at 226-27 (noting that the only foundational requirement would be that 
sufficient evidence to authenticate the exhibit under Rule 901 of the Rules of Evidence). 
An expert should not be prohibited from testifying about the CGA merely because he 
does not know the process by which the CGA was created.8 
n 
In the federal courts, a trial court may not repudiate its ruling on a pretrial suppression 
motion if it results in prejudice or surprise to a party. Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
301 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002); McRae v United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. App. 
1969). 
o 
"If an animation is used demonstratively, then the underlying technology or science 
used to create that animation is irrelevant to the case. Consider an analogy: Suppose an 
expert witness medical doctor is testifying about her expert opinion regarding a plaintiffs 
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The court reasoned that the photographs were inadmissible because they did not 
accurately reflect the scene that night. R. 1926:181-82. If the trial court's reasoning were 
correct, no exhibit could ever be authenticated if it were created after a crime. However, 
that is not the requirement of Rule 901. In order to authenticate a photograph, "the 
proponent must show that the photograph 'is what its proponent claims.'" State v. 
Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Utah R. Evid. 901(a)). "In 
general, if a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by a 
photograph testifies that the photograph accurately reflects those facts, it is admissible." 
State v. Purcell, 111 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985) (citing E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence § 214, at 671 (3d ed. 1984)). Any discrepancies in the photos, such as the time 
and place taken, can be explained by the witnesses and do not go to the adequacy of the 
foundation. Id. 
alleged neck injuries and is using a wax human skeleton model as a demonstrative exhibit 
to help clarify her testimony about how neck vertebrae can be injured in an automobile 
accident. It would be illogical to exclude that expert's medical opinion testimony simply 
because the expert physician witness did not know how such wax models are 
manufactured. The wax model is not evidence itself, and the expert is using it only to 
clarify her testimony. The technology used to make the wax model would not be the 
underlying science involved in the case. Similarly, the technology used to create a 
computer animation is not the underlying science at issue in the case either. Thus, it 
should not matter how the wax skeleton used by the expert was made, no matter how life-
like and helpful it may be in understanding the wax skeleton model. 
"Similarly then, a computer animation that merely clarifies an expert's opinion 
testimony is a demonstrative exhibit and therefore the expert should not be charged with 
knowing all the intricacies of how the animation was created and how exactly it 
generated the images that help the expert explain her testimony." Fred Galves, The 
Admissibility of 3-D Computer Animations Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
California Evidence Code, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 723, 735-36 (2008). 
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In this case, Gaskill repeatedly testified that both the animation and the 
photographs accurately reflected his opinion and the facts gathered by him. R. 1926:162, 
174, 176-177. That is the sole requirement of Rule 901. Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245. While 
there may have been defects in the photographs, those matters could be pointed out in 
cross-examination and were not proper bases to attack the foundation of his exhibits. 
The Lack of Ability to Present the Testimony Unconstitutionally Limited Mr. 
Perea's Defense. The court's decision drastically limited Mr. Perea's defense. The State 
must provide an indigent defendant with the assistance of expert testimony—one of the 
"basic tools of an adequate defense"—if needed. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 
82-83 (1985) ("when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in 
a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair 
opportunity to present his defense."); U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
Several commentators have noted that denying a defendant the ability to present a 
CGA to the jury "severely compromises the quality of the defense" and "denies criminal 
defendants their constitutional right to an adequate defense."9 In fact, "[n]o matter how 
9
 McGinnis Hadley, Access to CGAsf 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS at 879 (citing Robert 
Aronson and Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence By 
Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1486 ("[T]he 
use of high-tech evidence is often expensive . . . [and] may make it impossible for 
opposing counsel to counter effectively the animation or closing argument, and this may 
unfairly favor the prosecution because it often has more resources to finance this kind of 
evidentiary presentation") (citing Jennifer Robinson Boyle, State v. Pierce: Will Florida 
Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in Criminal Trials?, 
19 NOVA L. REV. 371, 383 (1994); Carlo D'Angelo, The Snoop Doggy Dogg Trial: A 
Look at How Computer Animation Will Impact Litigation in the Next Century, 32 U.SJF. 
L. REV. 561, 562-63 (1998). 
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effective or desirable a computer-generated exhibit might be to a prosecutor, the 
defendant's ability to respond meaningfully is a matter of fundamental fairness."10 
Courts have frequently allowed defendants to present computer animations and 
upheld the use of computer animations as an illustration of an expert's testimony. See 
People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (court allowed use of a 
computer-animated re-enactment showing defendant's version of an accident).11 In many 
Aronson & McMurtrie, supra n. 9, at 1486. 
11
 See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 1996); People v. 
Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); Bryant, 512 S.E.2d at 361; State v. 
Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2003); State v. Tollardo, 11 P.3d 1023, 1029 (N.M. App. 
2003) (opining that, "when the [CGA] is used to illustrate an opinion that an expert has 
arrived at without using the computer, the fact that the visual aid was generated by a 
computer ... does not matter because the witness can be questioned and cross-examined 
In that situation, the computer is no more or less than a drafting device"); Serge, 896 
A.2d at 1178 (Pa. 2006) ("Presently, had the Commonwealth's experts, a crime scene 
reconstructionist and a pathologist, used traditional methods, they may have drawn chalk 
diagrams or sketches on a blackboard to help explain the basis for their opinions. Instead, 
they used a CGA to more concisely and more clearly present their opinion. The 
difference is one of mode, not meaning. The law does not, and should not, prohibit 
proficient professional employment of new technology in the courtroom. This is, after all, 
the twenty-first century"). 
Juries will not overvalue animations. Datskow v. Teledyne Confl Motors Aircraft 
Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The mere fact that this was an 
animated video ... does not mean that the jury would ... give it more weight than it 
would otherwise have deserved. ... Jurors, exposed as they are to television, the movies, 
and picture magazines, are fairly sophisticated. With proper instruction, the danger of 
their overvaluing such proof is slight.1'1) (quoting 1 Jack. B. Weinstein & Margaret A. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence P 403[5], at 403-88 (1992))); R. Bennett, Jr., J. Leibman, R. 
Fetter, Seeing is Believing; or is it? An Empirical Study of Computer Simulations as 
Evidence, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 257, 285 (1999) (finding empirically "unwarranted" 
the claim that juries will find computer animations more persuasive). 
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ways, the use of a visual aide, like a CGA, helps jurors better understand and comprehend 
the expert's testimony.12 
In the high profile murder trial of Snoop Doggy Dogg, the defense created a "brief 
3-D computer animated video" summarizing evidence that normally would have required 
"numerous expert witnesses and hours of testimony" on the defense's version of the 
shooting. The Snoop Doggy Dogg Trial: A Look at How Computer Animation Will 
Impact Litigation in the Next Century, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 561, 565 (Spring, 1998). The 
video showed an overhead view, with bullet trajectories, allowing "the jury to see, from 
all possible angles, the exact entry and exit points of both wounds sustained by the 
victim." Id. at 565-66. The defense's "masterful trial work [and] sophisticated computer 
technology" won an acquittal. Id. at 567. 
Like in Snoop Dogg's case, the brief animation and photographs would have had 
an incalculable effect on the jury's ability to understand and visualize the professor's 
testimony. This denial effectively deprived Mr. Perea of the right to present a 
constitutionally adequate defense and deprived him of due process of law. 
Experts Have Wide Latitude to Interpret Facts. An expert may base his 
opinion on facts that are not admissible in evidence. Utah R. Evid. 703. Experts may base 
their opinions on facts or data that they perceive or on facts made known to them before 
David W. White-Lief, Effective Demonstrative Evidence: It's Your Most Persuasive 
Tool, Mass. L. Wkly., Jan. 17, 1994, at B37 (noting that "[o]ne study reported that jurors 
who received combined visual and oral presentations retained 650 percent more 
information compared to jurors who received only oral presentations"). 
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or during the hearing. Id. Experts may even give opinions to the ultimate issues to be 
decided. Utah R. Evid. 704; Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
Expert testimony does not have to be free from controversy and experts must only 
make a "threshold showing" of admissibility. Es kelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med, Ctr., 2010 
UT 59, % 12, 242 P.3d 59; Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974); see also Smith v. 
Grand Canyon, 2003 UT 57, \ 25, 84 P.3d 1154 ("disputes over the merits of competing 
opinions in non-novel scientific, technical, or specialized fields are properly left to the 
trier of fact to resolve"). 
In Eskelson, like this case, the trial court excluded the testimony of an expert 
because he lacked methodology, "chose to believe only facts in the record that supported 
his argument," and failed to apply scientific principles. Id. at f^ 13. This Court said that 
the physician, under Rule 702, did not have to articulate a specific methodology. Id. at \ 
15. This Court also held that the court erred in excluding the expert's opinion because the 
expert relied on selective testimony: 
Although an expert cannot give opinion testimony that "flies in the face of 
uncontroverted physical facts also in evidence," an expert can rely on his own 
interpretation of facts that have a foundation in the evidence, even if those facts 
are in dispute. Indeed, we allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before them. 
Id. at Tf 16.13 Additionally, the trial court in Eskelson disallowed the expert's testimony 
because the expert's testimony implied witnesses' truthfulness. Id. at *[j 17. This Court 
13
 Citing Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 120, 110 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 
1941), also citing State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223 (Utah 1986) (experts may rely 
on inadmissible facts); Micro Chem, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (the trial court should not evaluate the correctness of conflicting facts relied upon 
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disagreed, holding that relying on the testimony of one witness does not "constitute the 
expression of an opinion as to the credibility of that witness." Id. 
Once an expert witness is qualified as such, he may base his opinion on 
inadmissible evidence. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982). Any faults in the 
bases for the expert's opinion go to its weight and not to its admissibility and may be 
challenged on cross-examination. Id.14 
In this case, Gaskill based his testimony on his own observations and 
measurements conducted at the scene of the crime. R. 1926:161-62. He also based his 
conclusions on witness testimony and other scientific principles. Id. The mere fact that 
Gaskill's recitation of the facts differed from the State's, or from some of the witnesses, 
does not mean that his theory lacks foundation or should be inadmissible. By that 
reasoning, no expert could testify if her conclusions contradict the statements of 
witnesses. Poltrockv. Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company, 502 N.E.2d 
1200, 1203 (111. App. 1986) ("The fact that expert testimony may conflict with eyewitness 
testimony does not make it inadmissible where the court finds it to be of assistance to a 
jury in understanding complex issues").15 Gaskill's conclusions were supported by his 
by experts); Atkinson Warehousing & Distrib., Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 665, 
670 (D. Md. 2000) (ff[A]n opinion based upon a disputed fact may not be excluded 
simply because it pertains to an issue to be decided by the jury"). 
Id. ("The opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials 
on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, 
not to its admissibility.") 
Thousands of courts have allowed expert testimony, even when it contradicts lay 
testimony. See e.g., Harrington v. Richter, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 770, 789; 178 L. Ed. 
2d 624, 644 (2011) (expert's hypothesized testimony could have suggested that the 
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own observations and understanding of the facts in evidence and should not have been 
limited. As this Court said in Eskelson, "When ... the parties' experts rely on conflicting 
sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts 
underlying one expert's testimony." Eskelson, 2010 UT 15, f 16. The trial court 
essentially gutted the professor's testimony when it repeatedly prohibited him from 
testifying about any facts if they contradicted witness testimony. R. 1926:186-87, 191-95. 
In short, the court unfairly limited the professor to testimony consistent with the State's 
version of events. 
C The Court Unfairly Allowed the State to Rebut GaskiH's Testimony With 
Its Own Demonstrative Evidence. 
The third problem lies in allowing the State to rebut the professor's testimony with 
its own demonstrative evidence, albeit non-CGA evidence. The State's expert proffered a 
not-to-scale drawing of the scene on which he drew bullet trajectories with a ruler. R. 
1927:58. GaskiH's animation was no different, except that it was done on a computer, as 
opposed to a piece of paper. Mr. Wakefield did not visit the crime scene, did not take 
measurements, and used a not-to-scale drawing made by the State's CSI witness. R. 
1928:8; 1927:46, 69. Gaskill visited the scene, took pictures, took measurements and 
defendant's version of events was true and that victim's was not; however testimony 
might have implicated defendant as well); Allen v. State, 521 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga. 1999); 
Palmer v. Mississippi, 34 So.3d 1207, 1212 (Miss. App. 2010) (expert testimony 
contradicted defendant's version of events); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 835 (9 
Cir. 2001); People v. Villareal, 559 N.E.2d 77, 82 (111. App. 1990) (newly discovered 
firearms expert's testimony so contradicted officer's events that defendant was entitled to 
a new trial); Commonwealth v. Metzger, 450 A.2d 981, 984 (Pa. 1982) (lay witness's 
testimony contradicted by expert testimony and that jury could evaluate difference). 
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created an animation depicting his testimony. R. 1926:161-62. The court prohibited 
Gaskill's demonstrative exhibits but allowed Wakefield to use his.16 
The court allowed the State to rebut the defense's case with the exact type of 
evidence it ruled inadmissible in the defendant's case. The decision placed greater 
emphasis on the credibility of the State's expert and sent an impermissible message to the 
jury that the trial court agreed with the prosecution's case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED DEFENSE 
EVIDENCE OF FALSE CONFESSIONS 
Perhaps the State's most potent weapon in this case involves Mr. Perea's 
confession. One scholar commented that "the introduction of a confession makes the 
other aspects of a trial in court superfluous" ; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436,466 (1966) (explaining that a confession is "the most compelling possible evidence 
of guilt") (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The 
trial court's denial of the defense's attempts to present evidence of false confessions was 
erroneous and deprived the defendant of due process of law. 
In the interrogation room, the officers repeatedly "confronted" Riqo with their 
opinion that he was lying. R. 1909:212, 242, 243; 1926:20.18 Riqo then engaged in a 
Additionally, the defense did not have notice that Wakefield would be testifying as an 
expert in bullet trajectories, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13. See State v. 
Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, \ 11, 131 P.3d 292. R. 1927:26-27. 
17
 McCormick, C.T. (1972), p. 316. Handbook of the Law of Evidence (2nd ed.). St. Paul, 
MH: West. 
i o 
Detective Thomas admitted to being trained in interrogation "techniques" such as 
building rapport, sympathy, minimizing involvement, lying to suspects, telling suspects 
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"slumped demeanor." R. 1909:242. They suggested that Riqo might have fired the shots 
to protect Duran's children, who were in the vehicle, and his "demeanor started to change 
rapidly." R. 1909:212, 214, 243; 1926:20. Riqo "started to become nervous, a little 
scared"; his "chest started beating faster," he leaned forward in the chair, put his head 
down and began "tearing up." R. 1909:214, 216, 243: R. 1926:21, 94. Riqo said he cared 
for the children and wanted to protect them. R. 1909:214; R. 1926:92. He claimed he had 
blacked out. R. 1909:217; 1926:96. "He started to cry harder. Tears were running down 
his face." R. 1926:21.l9 
At this point, the officers decided to give Riqo "an out" or a way to "minimize 
[his] involvement" or to "lower [his] consequences"—and that was by confessing to the 
crime. R. 1909:230-31. The officer asked Riqo if he had a gun, and Riqo said that he did. 
R. 1926:21. Then Riqo said, "I just did it" and admitted to having a .22 caliber gun. R. 
1909:217; 1926:97. He also said that he stood on the floorboard while his car door was 
open and fired the shots over the SUV. R. 1909:218; 1926:22, 23-24, 98. Riqo said that 
he "killed his own cousin." R. 1909:218; 1926:98. He also said that he was the only one 
in the SUV with a gun. R. 1926:99. 
that they've been ratted out, fear, playing off emotions, trying to have suspects get 
burdens off their chests. R. 1926:32-33. 
19
 Detective Thomas admitted Riqo's emotions could have resulted from a fear of 
retaliation, considering that one individual, Paul Ashton, had been shot and that Riqo's 
grandmother's house had been shot at. R. 1926:53. However, Riqo never expressly told 
the officers that he was afraid. R. 1926:58. The detectives insisted that they never 
threatened or coerced Riqo. R. 1926:55-58, 100. 
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Riqo testified that he felt coerced and "disrespected" "because they asked mie 
about the calling the first time and I stated it wasn't me, that I was innocent. And I kept 
pleading my innocence, and they continued to go on with the conversation, on with the 
interrogation." R. 1910:33, 37. He also testified that the reason he felt afraid was because 
"[m]y brother called me and explained to me that they wanted to either get my sister or 
get my wife because they wanted me to feel the pain that they felt for Sabrina." R. 
1910:35, 37. He said the officers were "aggressive" and although they didn't yell or 
swear, they threatened him. R. 1910:38. According to Riqo, Detective Thomas told him 
during the interrogation, "that if I did want to protect my family that I can do this, which 
was take the blame and get me off the streets because he said to me that that's what they 
wanted. Either they were to get me off the streets or they would take care of it 
themselves." R. 1910:36. Riqo said that "I believe I was coerced into saying what they 
wanted me to because, like I said, they came aggressively." R. 1910:39. Riqo was not 
afraid of the officers, but he felt the officers threatened that his family would be harmed 
if he did not confess. R. 1910:40. 
A, The Trial Court Erroneously Prohibited the Defense from Presenting 
Expert Testimony on False Confessions 
The trial court reasoned that the jury was capable, by itself, to determine the 
existence of a false confession without the assistance of an expert. R. 1918:72. It also 
reasoned that the jury would overvalue expert testimony and that the science was not 
reliable. R. 1918:71-72. The trial court did not conduct a Rimmasch hearing or in any 
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way assess the reliability of the science—it merely gave an opinion. However, this 
conclusion contradicts a large body of scientific evidence. 
1. Juries Do Not Understand the Phenomenon of False 
Confessions and Frequently Disregard It Entirely 
Confessions exert such strong persuasive pull over juries because most people 
believe that "one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by 
an untrue statement." Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884); see also Lisa E. Hasel and 
Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions 
Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. Sci. 122, 122 (Jan. 2009) (noting that 
"people reflexively trust confessions"). 
This notion has largely been exposed as a myth.20 Cor ley v. United States, 129 S. 
Ct. 1558 (2009) ("there is mounting empirical evidence that [custodial police 
interrogation and its inherent] pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of 
people to confess to crimes they never committed") (citing Drizin & Leo, The Problem of 
False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L. REV. 891, 906-907 (2004)).21 To 
date, 271 people have been exonerated through DNA testing—and 25% of them falsely 
There exists an enormous body of scientific literature on false confessions. One of the 
best summaries of the literature was done by Saul M. Kassin, et al, Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 34, 3-38 
(attached in full as Addendum D). 
21
 See e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonnson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A 
Handbook 631-662 (2003) (citing nearly 800 articles relating to false confessions and 
police interrogations); Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 58 (1987) (finding 14.3% of wrongful 
convictions for potentially capital crimes based on false confessions). 
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confessed to their crimes. This Court stated that, "[i]t is beyond dispute that some 
people falsely confess to committing a crime that was never committed or was committed 
by someone else." State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10,121, 67 P-3d 477 (citing Professor 
Ofshe). As the United States Supreme Court said in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 
(1964): 
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of 
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the 
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends 
on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. 
Id. at 488-489 (footnotes omitted). 
Despite these phenomena, the public at large, and juries particularly, do not 
understand why an innocent person would confess to a crime he did not commit. The 
psychological research can help explain this phenomenon. Once the defendant is alone 
with police, they begin to use what is called the Reid Technique, whereby police use 
psychological tricks and subtle forms of coercion to get a suspect to confess. See Fred E. 
Inbau, et al, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (4 ed. 2004). The Supreme Court 
said that police interrogation "by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual." 
Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. at 1570. 
See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/iinderstand/False--
Confessions.php, last checked (May 25, 2011). See also Richard A. Leo, Police 
Interrogation and American Justice 243 (2008). Law enforcement officers surveyed in 
2007 estimated that 10% of their interrogations resulted in false confessions. Jessica R. 
Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding Juvenile 
Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 Behav. Sci. & L. 757, 770 (2007). 
See, e.g., Danielle E. Chojnacki et al, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert 
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 40 (2008). 
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Police using the Reid Technique separate the young person from his family or 
friends and put him in an interrogation room, which is designed to isolate him and make 
him feel helpless and trapped. See Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions. In the first 
stage, investigators try to shake a suspect from claims of innocence by repeatedly 
accusing the person of lying, refusing to listen to him, and by expressing confidence in 
his guilt. See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and 
Irrational Action, 14 DENV. L. REV. 979, 990 (1997). Once shaken, investigators offer 
the person a way out through confession. Id. Officers will minimize the defendant's 
involvement or engage in other tactics to make a confession seem like an easy way out of 
the situation. Kassin et al, Police-Induced Confessions (technique includes "suggesting to 
the suspect that the murder was ... provoked ... or accidental); Drizin & Leo, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. at 916. 
One study showed that 51% of defendants falsely confessed based on police 
pressure and 48% confessed to protect another person.24 The majority of false 
confessions occur in murder cases with persons under age 25 and among those with 
mental illnesses. Drizin & Leo, 82 N.C.L. REV. at 891-1007. One comprehensive study 
of false confessions found that age and mental disabilities were strong indicators of false 
confessions. Samuel R. Gross et al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 
24
 Sigurdsson, J.F., & Gudjonsson, G.H. (1996). Psychological Characteristics ofi(False 
Confessors "; A Study Among Icelandic Prison Inmates and Juvenile Offenders. 
PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, 20, 321-29. 
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2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523-53 (2005). 5 Nearly two-thirds of wrongful 
convictions involve, at least in part, a false confession. See Welsh S. White, Confessions 
in Capital Cases, 2003 U. I I I . L. REV. 979, 984 (2003). 
The Reid tactics can be particularly troubling for young people. In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 52 (1967) ("Authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability 
and trustworthiness of'confessions' by children").26 One study found that in a laboratory 
scenario, 78% of juveniles age 12-13, 75% of juveniles age 15-16, and 59% of young 
adults age 18-26 falsely confessed to an act they did not commit. Another study found 
the Reid Technique's "psychologically manipulative tactics ... eventually overwhelm 
many suspects and cause them to confess, whether guilty or not." Joshua A. Tepfer, et al, 
Righting the Wronged: Causes, Effects, and Remedies of Juvenile Wrongful Conviction, 
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 906-07 (2010).28 Additionally, those with low IQs and the 
mentally retarded are significantly more likely to give suggested answers and to falsely 
confess. Kassin & Gudjonsson at 53. 
It found that 44% of exonerees under age 18 falsely confessed compared to 13% of 
older exonerees. Id. 69% of exonerees with mental retardation falsely confessed. Id. 
"Overall, 55% of all the false confessions we found were from defendants who were 
under eighteen, or mentally disabled, or both." Id 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and 
Issues, Psychological Science in the Public Interest, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Nov. 2004), 52. 
Redlich & Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act not Committed: The Influence of 
Age and Suggestibility. LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 27, 141-56 (2003). 
As a result of the "deeply troubling fact" of juvenile false confessions, the authors 
recommend electronic recording of all interrogations and "developmentally appropriate 
interrogation and interview practices," such as the presence of an attorney, the 
elimination of suggested, leading, or confrontational questions and the elimination of the 
use of false evidence. Id. at 891, 916-18. 
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Juveniles are particularly susceptible because they lack psychological 
development and act impulsively based on short-term gain, rather than long-term 
consequences. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (unconstitutional to execute 
juveniles because they are "categorically" different from adults); Kassin et al., Police-
Induced Confessions, Juveniles' short-tenm decision-making often leads them to falsely 
confess on a misguided assumption that it will end the pressures of interrogation. Id29 
Even the proponents of the Reid Technique acknowledge that minors are at a significant 
risk to falsely confess and that investigators must "exercise extreme caution" when 
interrogating a juvenile or a mentally ill person.30 
Even though innocent, a suspect may reasonably determine that "continued resistance 
is futile because the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence." 
Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 
2053 (1998). 
See Investigator Tips, John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., 
http://www.reidxom/educational info/r tips.html?serial-108083943 8473936 (last 
checked May 28, 2011). The Reid Technique proponents assert that "[e]very interrogator 
must exercise extreme caution and care when interviewing or interrogating a juvenile or a 
person who is mentally or psychologically impaired. Certainly these individuals can and 
do commit very serious crimes. But when a juvenile or person who is mentally or 
psychologically impaired confesses, the investigator should exercise extreme diligence in 
establishing the accuracy of such a statement through subsequent corroboration. In these 
situations it is imperative that interrogators do not reveal details of the crime so that they 
can use the disclosure of such information by the suspect as verification of the 
confession's authenticity." Id. See also Allison D. Redlich, Righting the Wronged: 
Causes, Effects, and Remedies of Juvenile Wrongful Conviction, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 
943, 952-53 (2010) ("American interrogation techniques are not developmentally 
informed or appropriate. When these inappropriate techniques are employed on juveniles, 
who are at varying stages of immature development cognitively, socially, emotionally, 
and neurologically, and who are misjudged to be guilty, the risk of false confession 
increases"). See also, Steven A. Drizin & Beth Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile 
Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce 
30 
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As the Reid Technique's proponents acknowledge Juveniles who are mentally ill 
are at grave risk to falsely confess. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) 
(noting that the mentally retarded are more likely to falsely confess). Very generally, the 
mentally ill overly rely on authority, feign competence, have short attention spans and 
memory gaps, lack impulse control and accept blame for negative outcomes. See R. 
Perske, Understanding Persons With Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice 
System: Indicators of Progress?, 42 MENTAL RETARDATION 484 (2004). Specifically, 
people with ADHD have been found to falsely confess at significantly higher rates than 
normal. Kassin et al, Police-Induced Confessions31 
Jurors are completely unaware of these phenomena. In one particular study, 
researchers presented mock jurors with one of these types of evidence: circumstantial 
evidence, eyewitness testimony, and a confession.32 Jurors who heard the confessions 
were significantly more likely to find guilt than jurors who did not. Id. A confession can 
outweigh for jurors significant amounts of exculpatory evidence, such as conflicting 
physical evidence, contradictory witness testimony, and alibis. See Hasel and Kassin, 
infra at 122. 
Coerced and False Confessions From Juvenile Suspects in INTERROGATIONS, 
CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127-62,135 (G.D. Lassiter ed. 2004). 
Citing Gudjonnson et al, Interrogative Suggestibility, Compliance and False 
Confessions Among Prison Inmates and their Relationship with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Symptoms, PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE (in press). 
Gerald R. Miller and F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their Implications 
for Psychological Research, in Bruce Dennis Sales (ed.), Psychology in the Legal 
Process, 19,20-21(1977). 
31 
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When the false confessors pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, the jury 
conviction rates ranged from 73% (Leo & Ofshe, 1998) to 81% (Drizin & Leo, 
2004). These figures led Drizin and Leo (2004) to describe confession evidence as 
inherently prejudicial and highly damaging to a defendant, even if it is the product 
of coercive interrogation, even if it is supported by no other evidence, and even if 
it is ultimately proven false beyond any reasonable doubt." 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions at 56. 
Psychological research has shown that juries trust confessions, even when they 
were elicited through high-pressure methods of interrogation. Id. Ordinary people 
continue to assume that when a person confesses, he must mean it. Id. Mock jurors have 
been shown to vote guilty, even when they believe officers coerced the confession. Id. at 
However, contrary to popular belief, false confessions have been found to be 
extremely difficult to detect. Testing has shown that students were no better than chance 
at detecting true or false confessions. Id. One study found that potential jurors could 
identify coercive practices by the police interrogations, but that they did not "believe that 
psychological interrogation techniques were likely to elicit false confessions." Leo & Liu, 
What Do Potential Jurors Know About Police Interrogation Techniques and False 
Confessions?, University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2009-17 (attached as 
Addendum E). 
33
 Kassin and Gudjonsson posit that jurors tend to believe confessions because they take 
people's words at face value, that most believe that people would not engage in self-
destructive behaviors, and that most people are not proficient at detecting deception. 
Kassin & Gudjonnson, The Psychology of Confessions at 57. 
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Not only do jurors have difficulty with these concepts, but law enforcement 
officers have been found to be less likely to detect a false confession than introduction to 
psychology students or even pure chance. Saul M. Kassin et al., "I'd Know a False 
Confession if I Saw One ": A Comparative Study of College Students and Police 
Investigators, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 214 (2005). Despite the fact that police 
investigators were the least likely group to identify a false confession, they exhibited a 
higher confidence in their abilities than any other group. Id. at 218-19. 
2. The Jury in This Case Needed Expert Assistance to Understand the 
Potential that Riqo Falsely Confessed to the Crime 
Kassin and Gudjonsson assert that exclusion of expert testimony on false 
confessions is "wholly without merit" and that these rulings "contradict[] a broad range 
of research findings." Kassin & Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions at 59. 
[I]t is now clear that such testimony is amply supported not only by anecdotes and 
case studies of wrongful convictions, but also by a long history of basic 
psychology and an extensive forensic science literature, as summarized not only in 
this monograph but also in several recently published books. 
Id 
This Court's decision in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103 is 
particularly instructive as to this issue. In Clopten, the defendant sought to introduce 
expert testimony on the flaws in eyewitness identification. Id. at f^ 3. This Court reversed 
the trial court's decision to disallow the testimony. Id. at \ 49. This Court opined that 
jurors generally are unaware of the limitations of eyewitness identifications. Id. at \ 8 
(citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). However, this Court concluded that 
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the scientific literature supported major issues with mistaken identification, and that 
jurors not only were "unaware of these deficiencies in human perception and memory" 
but that they tended to give such identifications significant weight. Id. at Tf 15. 
This Court reasoned that expert testimony carried significant advantages over 
other methods, such as cross-examination or jury instructions. Id. at f^ 18. "When expert 
testimony is used correctly, the end result is a jury that is better able to reach a just 
decision." Id. at f^ 20. Additionally, cross-examination and jury instructions were shown 
to do "little to help a jury spot a mistaken identification." Id. at \ 21-24. Jury instructions, 
in particular, come too late, are too buried, and only generally touch the empirical 
evidence so much so that they lack effectiveness with a jury. Id. at Tf 24. 
As to future admissibility, this Court held that in cases of stranger identification, 
expert testimony on misidentifications will meet Rule 702's requirement that the 
evidence "assist the jury." Id. at J^ 32-33. The Court also held that expert testimony on 
mistaken identification is the product of reliable principles and methodology. Id. at f 35. 
Nor should expert testimony be excluded merely because it intrudes on the province of 
the jury. Id. at % 36. In fact, this Court concluded that "eyewitness expert testimony 
should therefore be routinely admitted, regardless of whether the trial judge decides to 
issue a cautionary instruction." Id. at \ 49. 
The issue in this case is no different that than in Clopten. The phenomenon of false 
confessions is supported by a massive body of empirical evidence. See United States v. 
Hall, 91A F. Supp. 1198 (CD. 111. 1997) (finding "that the science of social psychology, 
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and specifically the field involving the use of coercion in interrogations, is sufficiently 
developed in its methods to constitute a reliable body of specialized knowledge under 
Rule 702"). The literature also supports the assertion that jurors are completely unaware 
of this phenomenon. Expert testimony, also, would dramatically assist jurors in 
understanding false confessions, and as reasoned in Clopten, should be presumptively 
admissible. 
This Court's decision in State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009 is also 
relevant to this issue. In Rettenberger, the defendant, age 18, moved to suppress his 
confession to murder on the grounds that it was involuntary. Id, at Tj 1. This Court said 
that courts must consider a person's age, mental health, education and mental deficiency 
in evaluating whether the person voluntarily confessed to a crime. Id. at f^ 15. This Court 
remanded the case and after considering most of the research at issue here—police 
representations, false friend techniques, threats and promises, the length and time of the 
interrogation, and the defendant's subjective characteristics, such as his below-average 
IQ, ADD, brain development at age 15 and other mental illnesses—found that his 
confession was involuntary. Id. at f^l[ 20-40, 45. 
Perhaps most troublesome is that Riqo Perea fits into both suspect categories. Riqo 
was 19 years old on the date of the offense and has been diagnosed with an IQ of 77 and 
with a variety of mental illnesses, including ADHD and bipolar disorder. In fact, Riqo's 
performance on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test put his brain development at age 15 
on one part and at age 10 or 11 on the other. Riqo testified that he admitted to the 
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shooting, but it was because of the officers threatened him that if he did not admit guilt, 
his family would be harmed. R. 1910:36-40. Riqo is exactly the type of individual whom 
the literature claims is highly susceptible to police coercion and who is most likely to 
falsely confess to a crime. In fact, in most ways Riqo is no different from Rettenberger. 
His IQ is in the bottom 4%, his brain development puts him under age 18, and his ADHD 
and other mental illnesses would make him extremely susceptible to police pressure. 
The defendant proffered to have one of the nation's premier experts, Dr. Richard 
Ofshe, testify. According to counsel, Dr. Ofshe could have both opined that Riqo's 
confession contained classic hallmarks of a false confession and also, he could have 
educated the jury about false confessions generally. R. 1928:9. The court prohibited both 
types of testimony. R. 1918:73; 1608-14. 
Courts have frequently allowed expert testimony on false confessions.34 Dr. Ofshe, 
in particular, has testified repeatedly in courts around the United States. See Addendum 
F. By defendant's count, Dr. Ofshe has been referenced in eighty-five appellate opinions. 
Id. In 54% of them, Dr. Ofshe actually testified about false confessions or was allowed to 
See also United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995) (trial court erroneously 
excluded expert testimony on defendant's false confession); United States v. Raposo, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19551, 1998 WL 879723 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing expert 
testimony on false confessions); Hall, 91A F. Supp. 1198; State v. Buechler, 572 N.W.2d 
65, 72-74 (Neb. 1998) (trial court erred in refusing to admit expert testimony on false 
confessions); Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Ind. App. 1997) (affirming trial 
court's decision to admit, on limited grounds, expert witness testimony regarding police 
interrogation tactics); State v. Baldwin, 125 N.C. App. 530, 482 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. App. 
1997) (holding that the trial court erred in excluding expert witness testimony that police 
interrogation tactics made defendant susceptible to giving a false confession). 
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testify. Id. In 22% of the reported opinions, Dr. Ofshe was cited as persuasive authority. 
This Court has cited Dr. Ofshe as authority on false confessions. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10 
at 1flj 21, 27 n. 3, 53, 54, 56; State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, Iffl 22, 23, 31, 984 P.2d 
1009. In United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996), the trial court excluded Dr. 
Ofshe's testimony, reasoning that jurors could comprehend false confessions without 
expert assistance. The 7th Circuit disagreed: 
This ruling overlooked the utility of valid social science. Even though the 
jury may have had beliefs about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs 
were correct. Properly conducted social science research often shows that 
commonly held beliefs are in error. Dr. Ofshe's testimony ... would have let the 
jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to recognize 
it, and how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case being tried. ... 
It was precisely because juries are unlikely to know that social scientists 
and psychologists have identified a personality disorder that will cause individuals 
to make false confessions that the testimony would have assisted the jury in 
making its decision. It would have been up to the jury, of course, to decide how 
much weight to attach to Dr. Ofshe's theory, and to decide whether they believed 
his explanation of Hall's behavior or the more commonplace explanation that the 
confession was true. 
Id. at 1345; see also Scott v. Chicago, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534 (N.D. 111. 2010) 
(finding that "Ofshe has been held to meet the Daubert-Kumho standards by a wide 
margin on numerous occasions"). 
Unfortunately, this case provides virtually no record, other than the officers' 
testimony, about the form and methods of the interrogation. In Rettenberger, this Court 
was able to review the recording of the confession itself, assess the techniques used by 
In other words, Dr. Ofhse had either testified or been cited favorably in 76% of the 
reported opinions. In twenty cases (or 24%) Dr. Ofshe was not allowed to testify. 
However, in several of the opinions, the voluntariness of the confession was not at issue 
or there was little to no evidence of police coercion. See Addendum F. 
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the police and the behavior of the defendant and determine, using the exact science at 
issue in this case, much of it authored by the defense's expert in this case, to determine 
the voluntariness of the confession. Mr. Perea has extreme difficulty in rebutting any 
presumption that his confession was voluntarily given because the record is entirely 
devoid of what methods the officers used. 
However, officers acknowledged using specific ploys: they acknowledged using 
the false friend technique and they also acknowledged repeatedly confronting Riqo with 
their conclusion that he was lying. R. 1909:212, 242, 243; 1926:20. They also 
acknowledged using minimization techniques: telling Riqo that he probably shot to 
"protect the kids" and that he probably meant to shoot high. R. 1909:212, 214, 230-31, 
243; 1926:20. Riqo claims the officers lied and threatened him, however, the officers 
denied these assertions. R. 1910:36-40; 1926:55-58, 100. 
The relevant test under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence is whether the proffered 
testimony would assist the jury. Utah R. Evid. 702(a). Courts should not exclude expert 
testimony merely because it covers matters that jurors can understand. See Weinstein 's 
Evidence, P. 702[02] at 702-20 to 702-21 (1996); Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure-Evidence, § 6644 at 265-66 (Interim edition 1992). 
As demonstrated, juries have little comprehension of the realities of false 
confessions. Ronald Houston testified that Riqo Perea's IQ was 77 and that he suffered 
from a variety of mental illnesses—these same mental illnesses and Riqo's age make it 
much more likely that he would be susceptible to a false confession. The trial court 
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erroneously excluded this valuable testimony from the jury's consideration and left them 
with a false impression of the potential reliability of Riqo's confession. 
III. TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF FALSE CONFESSIONS, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REQUIRE POLICE TO RECORD CONFESSIONS THAT OCCUR AT 
THE POLICE STATION 
Riqo was taken to the police station, where officers put him in an interrogation 
room which was equipped with a closed-circuit television. R. 1909:208; 1926:86. One 
officer watched on television in another room that was capable of recording the entire 
conversation. R. 1909:226; 1926:35. Even though the equipment was not difficult to 
operate, Detective Gent said that in ten years he had never recorded an interrogation 
because it was a department policy and that he "chose not to" record because his report 
and notes were more accurate than a video recording. R. 1909:226-228; 1926:37. 
However, the detective acknowledged recording phone calls previously and using his 
small desk tape recorder to record a conversation with Dominque Duran in this case. R. 
1926:40, 122. He admitted he could have used the small tape recorder to record Riqo's 
interrogation. R. 1926:122. 
This interview took a total of an hour and forty minutes, which Detective Thomas 
condensed down to a one-page report that he insisted "covered all the information that 
was gathered in the interview." R. 1909:222; 1926:38-39.36 Over the next hour or so, 
Officers and Riqo sat at a computer while Detective Gent typed Riqo's confession, 
allegedly as Riqo spoke it. R. 1909:219-223; 1926:101, 105-07. Detective Gent 
36
 Officers also testified that the interview took 45 minutes or an hour. R. 1926:36, 102. 
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acknowledged he made several typos. R. 1926:124. Riqo read the statement and signed it. 
R. 1909:223; 1926:106-07. 
This Court has previously held that under the Utah Constitution, officers are not 
required to record confessions. State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). However, 
this Court expressed reservations about officers who violate these policies: 
When a formal confession is given in a police station, it could, and should, be 
recorded. But confessions, and admissions short of a confession, can be made 
anywhere at unexpected times and places where formal recording is impossible. 
Barring all such evidence would deprive the courts of much evidence that is 
generally reliable. Thus, we hold that contemporaneous recording of a confession 
is not mandated by the Utah Constitution. 
Although, in accord with other courts, we refrain from requiring recording of 
interrogations under the Utah Constitution, we note several policy reasons for 
recording interrogations. These include avoiding unwarranted claims of coercion 
and avoiding actual coercive tactics by police. In addition, recording an 
interrogation may show the "voluntariness of the confession, the context in which 
a particular statement was made, and . . . the actual content of the statement." 
Id at 427 (citing Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988)). 
In a case similar to this one, this Court held that a defendant's confession, written 
down by the officer, and signed by the defendant, did not violate his rights. State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989). However, this Court indicated that "we do not 
sanction the particular manner in which [the confession] was recorded in this case." Id. 
The Court emphasized the importance of recording confessions verbatim: 
This process not only helped insure that the defendant's confession was not 
coerced, but also provided both the trial court and appellate court with the correct 
tools for effectively and efficiently reviewing the defendant's contentions, as well 
as the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Such a process guarantees 
that constitutional rights are protected and justice is effected. Nevertheless, while 
the dictation process that occurred in this case could conceivably amount, in other 
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instances, to deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights, that was not the 
case here. 
Id (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
This Court has yet to promulgate a remedy in situations in which officers are at the 
police station, have the capacity to record an interrogation, and yet consciously choose 
not to do so. In fact, Villarreal seems to stand for the proposition that officers taking a 
confession in a police station must record the confession. Mr. Perea asserts that this case 
presents a unique opportunity for this Court to address police officers' continued 
disregard of this Court's patient calls for reform. 
A. Police Have Continued to Violate This Court's Suggestion 
This Court has held that if a confession is given at a police station, "it could, and 
should, be recorded." Id. (emphasis added). It also previously stated it did not sanction 
the non-recording of interrogations. Carter, 116 P.2d at 891. In this case officers 
consciously chose not to record an interrogation at the police station in which recording 
technology was actually being used to monitor the conversation. "When a police officer 
intentionally violates what he knows to be a constitutional command, exclusion is 
essential to conform police behavior to the law. Such a 'flagrant' violation is in marked 
J /
 In State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of 
Appeals also encouraged recording interrogations, while declining to mandate them, 
stating that recordings help avoid "unwarranted claims of coercion and avoiding actual 
coercive tactics by police. In addition, recording an interrogation may show the 
'voluntariness of the confession, the context in which a particular statement was made, 
and . . . the actual content of the statement'" (internal citation omitted). 
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contrast to a violation that is the product of a good-faith misunderstanding of the relevant 
constitutional requirements." New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1990). 
This is not a case in which the police officers acted in ignorance or on a good faith 
reliance on the law. This Court expressly and repeatedly has asked police officers to 
record confessions in police stations. These officers chose not to and defended their 
disregard of this Court's suggestion by stating that their notes were "more accurate" than 
an actual recording of the interrogation. PL 1909:227. 
B. Recordings of Interrogations are Vital to Ascertaining Truth and Their 
Existence Cannot Depend on a Police Officer's Whim. 
i n 
Utah courts have recorded their official proceedings for over twenty years. Yet 
judges, juries and lawyers frequently have to reconstruct the precise details of an 
interrogation—upon which hangs a person's liberty—without a record of it if the police, 
the party with the only incentive not to record this evidence, chooses not to preserve it. 
Such reasoning defies logic and should defy Utah law. 
38
 See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-201(l)(A) ("A video or audio recording system shall 
maintain the verbatim record of all court proceedings"); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-405 
("The Judicial Council shall by rule provide for the means of maintaining the record of 
proceedings in the courts of record by official court reporters or by electronic recording 
devices.") (enacted 1988); 78A-5-108 (enacted 1989). 
39
 The Supreme Court likened police interrogation to "testimony" demanding the same 
protections of confrontation. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) 
("Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial 
under even a narrow standard"). Thus, police interrogations clearly would require the 
same protections of all judicial testimony—a contemporaneous recording. 
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Courts, and even civil litigants, expect contemporaneous recording of their work. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reasoned 
We believe that the electronic recording of interrogations would, in many cases, be 
a helpful tool in evaluating the voluntariness of confessions. Defendants, 
prosecutors, and courts spend an enormous amount of time and effort trying to 
determine precisely what transpires during custodial interrogations, and all would 
be benefited in some way by a complete electronic recording. 
Commonwealth v. Fryar, 610 N.E.2d 903, 910, n.8 (Mass. 1993). 
Unfortunately, the police have ignored this Court's repeatedly patient calls for a 
uniform system of recording. It appears that the Ogden Police Department prefers to risk 
a confession being ruled involuntary than to let courts and juries know exactly how it was 
obtained. See R. 1926:37 (Ogden detective policy was not to record confessions). This 
Court has not hesitated to impose duties on law enforcement in the interrogation context. 
State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297, 302 (Utah 1980) ("Police interrogation must, of course, 
always be reasonable, and police must conduct such interviews in a responsible manner") 
(emphasis added). 
Currently, five states statutorily require recording confessions.41 Additionally, 
several state courts have also required recording confessions.42 Recording would not be 
unduly burdensome or difficult for law enforcement to implement. 
Contemporaneous recording of a trial is required in criminal appeals, UTAH R. APP. 
PRO. 12(a)(1), and a transcript is essential for appellate review. Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc. 
v. Public Serv. Comm % 452 P.2d 287 (Utah 1969); Rule 4-201, Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Civil practice in the analogous pretrial "investigative" context is 
premised upon availability of a contemporaneous verbatim record. See UTAH R. Civ. 
PRO. 30(b)(2) (depositions shall be recorded "by sound, sound-and-visual, or 
stenographic means"). 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The cost of the equipment and its operation is minimal. The machinery is not 
difficult to use. A recording speaks for itself literally on questions concerning 
what was said and in what manner. Recording would tend to eliminate certain 
challenges to the admissibility of defendants' statements and to make easier the 
resolution of many challenges that are made. 
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1328-29 (Mass. 1996). Like this Court, courts 
nationwide have strongly recommended recording.43 In fact, as one court candidly 
41
 Texas, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia. See Joshua M. 
Snavely, The Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Who Gets to Hold the 
Remote? A Separation of Powers Battle, 35 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 193, 195 (2010). 
42
 See e.g., In re Jerrell, C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, 166-73 (Wis. 2005) (confessions of 
juveniles are not admissible if police fail to record the confession); State v. Cook, 179 
N.J. 533, 562 (N.J. 2004) (appointing a committee to investigate the recording 
requirement); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (Alaska 1985) (failure to 
electronically record custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates 
due process); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (all custodial 
interrogation must be electronically recorded when occurring at a place of detention to 
ensure the fair administration of justice). 
43
 See State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 772 (Tenn. 2001) ("There can be little doubt that 
electronically recording custodial interrogations would reduce the amount of time spent 
in court resolving disputes over what occurred during the interrogation. As a result, the 
judiciary would be relieved of much of the burden of resolving these disputes. In light of 
the slight inconvenience and expense associated with electronically recording custodial 
interrogations, sound policy considerations support its adoption as a law enforcement 
practice."); People v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he recording of 
an interview with either a suspect or a witness, either by audiotape or otherwise, may 
remove some questions that may later arise with respect to the contents of that interview. 
For that reason, it may well be better investigative practice to make such a precise record 
of any interview as the circumstances may permit"); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 745-
46 (Hawaii 1994) ("[H]aving an electronic recording of all custodial interrogations would 
undoubtedly assist the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth.... A recording would be 
helpful to both the suspect and the police by obviating the 'swearing contest' which too 
often arises when an accused maintains that she asserted her constitutional right to remain 
silent or requested an attorney and the police testify to the contrary. A recording would 
also 'help to demonstrate the voluntariness of the confession, the context in which a 
particular statement was made and of course, the actual content of the statement.'"). A 
cogent summary of recording's benefits was provided in Stoker v. State, 692 N.E.2d 
1386, 1390 (Ind. App. Ct. 1998): 
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admitted, "to the best of our knowledge, no court in any jurisdiction has ever concluded 
that the tape recording of custodial interrogations in places of detention would be 
detrimental ...." Stoker v. State, 692 N.E.2d 1386, 1390, n.10 (Ind. App. Ct. 1998). 
Recordings are ubiquitous. Failing to record confessions does more than 
influence the accuracy of determinations at trial. It creates an inference that the police 
have something to hide and it corrodes the legitimacy and credibility of the process. This 
is because most all of us encounter the ubiquity of recording transactions outside of the 
interrogation room. We record 911 calls,44 millions of customer service phone calls for 
"quality-assurance purposes,"45 and thousands of surveillance cameras record 
transactions in banks and convenience stores and the actions of ordinary people 
Nevertheless, although we impose no legal obligation, we discern few 
instances in which law enforcement officers would be justified in failing to record 
custodial interrogations in places of detention. Disputes regarding the 
circumstances of an interrogation would be minimized, in that a tape recording 
preserves undisturbed that which the mind may forget. In turn, the judiciary would 
be relieved of much of the burden of resolving disputes involving differing 
recollections of events which occurred. 
Moreover, the recording would serve to protect police officers against false 
allegations that a confession was not obtained voluntarily. Therefore, in light of 
the slight inconvenience and expense associated with the recording of custodial 
interrogations in their entirety, it is strongly recommended, as a matter of sound 
policy, that law enforcement officers adopt this procedure. 
44
 State v. Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ^  3, 232 P.3d 1016 (district court concluded that victim 
sounded intoxicated after listening to the 911 call); State v. CDL, 2011 UT App 55, 250 
P.3d 69 (911 call reviewed extensively for admissibility); Salt Lake City v. Williams, 
2005 UT App 493, ^  8, 128 P.3d 47 (trial court properly admitted 911 recording). 
45
 Chuck Salter, This Call is Being Recorded. . .for More than you Think, 78 FAST 
COMPANY 34 (January 2004) ("[Call recording firm NICE Systems] claims to provide 
call-recording software to 67 of the Fortune 100 companies and says its customer-service 
centers capture about 40 million calls a day.") (Italics in original). 
45 
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throughout the country. Yet the statement responsible for Riqo Perea's incarceration for 
life without parole may—or may not—be recorded at the sole, unfettered discretion of a 
police investigator. 
Federal magistrates must produce a "verbatim record" of telephonic warrants and 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the testimony and content of a warrant to 
be recorded. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(d)(3)(B)(ii); UTAH R. CRIM. PRO. R. 40 (1)(2). 
Governmental meetings which are open to the public must be recorded. See e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-4-203 (2009). In Utah, child sexual abuse interviews have been recorded 
for decades.47 We even record conversations in the jail. State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, 
165 P.3d 1185 (not ineffective assistance for defense counsel to fail to listen to jail 
recordings). In this case, Riqo's own jail recordings were used against him. R. 1928:52. 
Commentators have been calling for recording of custodial interrogations for over 
four decades. They have noted the anomaly of not recording custodial interrogations. 
Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of Public 
Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755 (2008) ("So many cities across the country have 
installed or upgraded [video surveillance] systems that research analysts estimate that the 
video surveillance market will almost double between 2006 and 2011, growing from $ 
6.6 billion to $11.9 billion"). 
47
 See e.g., State v. hamper, 119 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1989) (videotape of police interview 
with a child fit trustworthiness standards and was properly admitted); Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-4a-414(l)(a)(i) (interviews of children in sex abuse cases "shall be recorded visually 
and aurally on film, videotape, or by other electronic means"). 
48
 See, e.g., James P. Barber & Philip R. Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 
HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1020-26, 1040 (1974); Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. 
Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 238-43 (1977); 
Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 
47 DENV. L.J. 1, 45 (1970); Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal 
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 678 (1966); Saul M. Kassin et 
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With this truism [that civil depositions must be recorded to be admissible], it is 
stunning that we do not require verbatim transcripts of criminal interrogations, 
where the stakes are so much higher, access to information about psychological 
pressures so much more important, and legal representation (of either party) so 
much less likely. 
Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO STATE J. CRIM.L. 309, 316-17 (2003).49 
Video recording is widely available to law enforcement and helps them do 
their job better. Paul Cassell, one of the most persistent critics of the Miranda regime, 
has also concluded that recording interrogations has immense benefits: 
Recording confessions also promises to be effective in preventing not only 
physical coercion but also in detecting, if not preventing, other fine points of 
coercion as well. In this regard, it is interesting that some of the most detailed 
assessments of voluntariness have come in cases of recorded interrogations, which 
al, Police Induced Confessions at 23 ("Without an electronic recording of the entire 
interrogation process, courts are thus left to decide a swearing contest between the 
suspect and the detective over the source of the details contained within the confession"); 
Saul M. Kassin, Wrongful Convictions: Understanding and Addressing Criminal 
Injustice, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1227 (2010); Jennifer J. Ratcliff and Victoria M. Jager, The 
Hidden Consequences of Racial Salience in Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 
16 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 200 (2010) (recommending equal-focused videotaped 
confessions to avoid camera perspective bias). 
See also, Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, Comes A Time: The Case For Recording 
Interrogations, 61 MONTANA LAW REVIEW 223 (2000); Brandon L. Garrett, The 
Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1118 (2010) ("Increasing 
numbers of local police departments and states have adopted one crucial reform: 
videotaping entire interrogations. Contaminated false confessions can be inexpensively 
discouraged by requiring recording of entire interrogations."). 
FBI Agent Julie Renee Linkins summarizes the argument well: "The time has 
come ... to embrace electronic recording of custodial investigative interviews .... It 
matters little how the mandate comes about; legislation, policy, and court requirements 
all can do the job. What matters is that recordings can enhance lawful investigations, 
safeguard individuals' rights, guard against false accusations, and conserve court 
resources. The collective interests of justice demand nothing less." Julie Renee Linkins, 
Satisfy The Demands Of Justice: Embrace Electronic Recording Of Custodial 
Investigative Interviews Through Legislation, Agency Policy, Or Court Mandate, 44 AM. 
CRIM.L.REV. 141,173 (2007). 
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permitted judges to parse implicit promises and threats made to obtain an 
admission. Recording also allows a review of police overbearing that might not be 
revealed in dry testimony. Taping is thus the only means of eliminating "swearing 
contests" about what went on in the interrogation room. 
Videotaping also promises to offer more effective protection against... false 
confessions induced by noncoercive police questioning. A complete record of the 
proceedings promises to be the most effective means of identifying such cases.50 
There is no excuse for the failure to record an interrogation conducted in a 
detention or law enforcement facility. For over a half a century Utah law enforcement has 
had the capability to record interviews.51 Videotaping equipment is apparently 
sufficiently available for the State's law enforcement agencies to use it to record booking 
procedures. State v. Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Beyond the State of Utah, law enforcement agencies around the country routinely 
use video recording. 80% of American law enforcement agencies use some sort of 
recording device. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and The Right To Anonymity, 72 Miss. L. J. 213, 221 (2002). Police agencies 
typically become more satisfied once they record confessions, because they gain hard 
evidence of the confession. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Police Experiences with Recording 
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 N.W. 
UNIV.L.REV. 387, 488 (1996). 
51
 See State v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960) (defendant's 1958 interview with police 
was tape recorded and used against him); State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 
1982) (defendant's 1979 interview with police was recorded and admitted against him); 
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1994) (confession recorded in 1985); State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464-65 (Utah 1988) (court finds after reviewing recording of 1983 
confession that while some police interrogation tactics were threatening, defendant's 
confession remained voluntary); Tillman v. Utah, 2005 UT 56, ffi[ 5, 24-25, 128 P.3d 
1123 (Tillman's post-conviction petition was not procedurally barred because 
prosecution failed to disclose 1982/1983 recorded interviews of the defendant). 
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Custodial Interrogations (Summer 2004). The recordings also prevented the vast 
majority of defense motions to suppress. Id. 
Jurisdictions adopting a recording requirement recognize that in certain 
circumstances recording may not be feasible, and that despite the best efforts of 
responsible law enforcement officers, events beyond their control sometimes intervene. 
In Minnesota, the failure to record a custodial interrogation results in exclusion of the 
statement if the violation is "substantial." Substantiality is determined on a case-by-case 
basis. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. 
Video recording helps judges determine voluntariness. For 125 years, in order 
to ensure the reliability of confessions, this Court has steadfastly recognized and 
discharged its obligation to ensure that statements produced by custodial interrogation are 
voluntary. Recording will assist both trial and appellate judges in making these 
determinations. See State v. Bozung, 2011 UT 2, ^ 3,245 P.3d 739 (the district court and 
the appellate court reviewed the entire video and audio recording of defendant's 
interrogation and made findings regarding suppression); State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50, 
Tffl 30-32, 216 P.3d 956 (no error to admit video recorded interrogation). 
Available online at 
http://ww\v.law.northwestem.edu/wrongllilconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/lalseco 
nfessions/SuUiyj^^ accessed May 28, 2011) (attached as Addendum G) 
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 Mauehley, 2003 UT 10; State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009; State v. 
Mabe, 864 P.2d 890 (Utah 1993); State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 302 (Utah 1973); State v. 
Strohm, 456 P.2d 170 (Utah 1969); State v. Gardner, 230 P.2d 559 (Utah 1951); State v. 
Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943); State v. Wells, 100 P. 681 (Utah 1909); United States 
v. Kirkwood, 13 P. 234 (Utah 1886). 
49 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, the defendant alleged that the 
police took advantage of his mental impairments to obtain a Miranda waiver. Id. at f^ 14. 
This Court, "having reviewed the transcript and video of the interrogation" disagreed: the 
officers did not use the false friend technique or half-truth tactics, nor did they threaten or 
make promises to the defendant. Id. at \ 18. Justice Wilkins extensively analyzed the 
"critical portion" of the videotape in his assessment of the confession. Id. Tft} 58-62. In 
short, videotapes allow this Court, and other courts, to engage in a meaningful analysis of 
the issues raised. In Rettenberger, discussed infra section H.A.2., this Court extensively 
reviewed the two videotaped interrogations (the district court reviewed them four times) 
to determine that officers engaged in tactics that overwhelmed the particular defendant 
and affected the voluntariness of his confession. See, Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^ 3, 8 
n.2, 35, 39 ("the interview videotapes demonstrate" or "[t]he videotapes of the interviews 
support this assessment..."):; see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933-37 (Utah 1998) 
(after reviewing the recordings of defendant's confession this Court concluded that his 
confession was not obtained in violation of Miranda nor coerced). Nuanced (and 
accurate) review was possible because the interrogations were taped. 
Lessons learned from other jurisdictions. The experience of jurisdictions that 
have chosen to require electronic recordings demonstrate that: 1) recording will not 
happen through persuasion; 2) recording must be adopted in a uniform, comprehensive 
fashion; 3) recording would be comparatively easy to implement; and strongly suggest 
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that 4) once implemented, recording of custodial interrogations will benefit judges, 
jurors, prosecutors, defendants and police. 
In 1985, Alaska became the first U.S. jurisdiction to implement a recording 
requirement for custodial interrogations. It did so after five years of attempting to 
persuade law enforcement to adopt the practice voluntarily. The Alaska Supreme Court 
had first "advise[d] law enforcement agencies that as part of their duty to preserve 
evidence,... it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any questioning 
and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention." Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 
743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, this advice went unheeded.54 
After five years of having its clear recommendations ignored, the Alaska Supreme 
Court held that "recording is a requirement of state due process when the interrogation 
occurs in a place of detention and recording is feasible." Stephan v. State, at 711 P.2d 
1156, 1158-59 (Alaska 1985).55 The Alaska rule states that if a custodial interrogation 
conducted at a detention facility is not fully recorded, then the state must convince the 
'
4
 See McMahan v. State, 617 P.2d 494, 499 n.l 1 (Alaska 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 
839 (1981) ("Again we advise law enforcement agencies that, as part of their duty to 
preserve evidence, it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any 
questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention."); In re S.B. v. 
State, 614 P.2d 786, 790 n.9 (Alaska 1980) ("It will be a great aid to the trial court's 
determinations and our own review of the record if an electronic record of the police 
interview with a defendant is available from which the circumstances of a confession or 
other waiver of Miranda rights may be ascertained.") 
55
 The Alaska Supreme Court also found that a failure to record implicated other 
provisions beyond due process. "[Recording ... is now a reasonable and necessary 
safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right 
against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial." Stephan, 111 P.2d at 
1159-60. 
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court by a preponderance of the evidence that recording was not feasible under the 
circumstances, and in such cases the "failure to record should be viewed with distrust." 
Id. at 1162-63. The remedy for the failure to record is exclusion. 
Minnesota's Supreme Court implemented a recording requirement in 1994. See 
State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). The Minnesota Supreme Court, as 
has this Court, first tried recommending to law enforcement that interrogations be 
recorded as a means of enabling judicial review. See State v. Robinson, All N.W.2d 217, 
224 (Minn. 1988); State v. Pilcher, All N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991). These 
recommendations were ignored for six years. Then the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized, as had the Alaska Supreme Court, that a recording requirement would 
provid[e] a more accurate record of a defendant's interrogation and thus will 
reduce the number of disputes over the validity of Miranda warnings and the 
voluntariness of purported waivers. In addition, an accurate record makes it 
possible for a defendant to challenge misleading or false testimony and, at the 
same time, protects the state against meritless claims. ... A recording requirement 
also discourages unfair and psychologically coercive police tactics and thus results 
in more professional law enforcement. 
Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591 (Minn. 1994) (citations omitted). 
The National Institute of Justice found "a striking 97 percent of all departments 
that have ever videotaped suspects' statements continue to find such videotaping, on 
balance, to be useful." NIJ, Videotaping Interrogations. 
While this Court has previously decided that recordings are not constitutionally 
mandated because of the need for confessions to be taken in the field, Riqo Perea's case 
demonstrates that this Court must do something more to address the problem of the non-
52 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
recording of custodial police interrogations. Mr. Perea contends that this Court ought to 
require police to record any interrogation that occurs at a police station. 
C. The Absence of a Recording Makes it Extremely Difficult to Assess the 
Voluntariness of the Defendant's Confession. 
Perhaps most troublingly, the absence of a record of the interrogation leads to 
serious defects in attempting to assess the voluntariness of Mr. Perea's confession. As 
alleged in the trial court, Mr. Perea contended that because of his relative youth and 
mental illnesses coupled with interrogation tactics used by the police, he did not give a 
voluntary confession. He had an expert prepared to testify to that effect. He contended 
that the facts of his case nearly mirrored those of State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 
P.2d 1009, in which this Court, after painstakingly examining the videotaped 
interrogations, held that the defendant, who while 18, had the maturity of a 15-year old, a 
below-average IQ and ADD, coupled with police use of misrepresentations, false friend 
techniques and threats and promises, did not voluntarily confess. Riqo's subjective 
characteristics mirror exactly those of Rettenberger. In fact, the officers in this case 
admitted to using most of the Reid Techniques, including minimization, threats and false 
friend techniques. Like Rettenberger, this Court also could easily find that Riqo did not 
voluntarily confess to this offense. For the reasons herein stated, Mr. Perea reasserts that 
the trial court erroneously determined the voluntariness of his confession, especially 
given the trial court's refusal to hear expert testimony on the issue. 
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However, the difficulty lies in the fact that unlike Rettenberger, this Court lacks an 
objective record of the proceedings of the interrogation, which only increases the 
difficulty of making a finding that Riqo s confession was involuntary. This underscores 
the critical need to require recording of police-station interrogations. 
One analogy is appropriate at this stage. In this case, the officer engaged in a 
phone conversation with the defendant that the defendant recorded. R. 1909:29. The 
officer acknowledged the recording's accuracy and admitted it contained several 
statements that he did not put in his police report, including one in which the officer 
expressed his opinion that Riqo was not the shooter. R. 1910:11-26; 1926:40-41, 46-47. 
In fact, the officer disregarded all of the statements he made to Riqo as not "pertinent" or 
"important" enough to merit inclusion in his report. R. 1926:47, 49. Riqo's interrogation 
lasted over ninety minutes which the officer summarized into a page and a half report. 
There is no way the police report contains all of the statements made during an hour and 
a half interrogation. Despite the officer's confidence, like the phone call, the report lacks 
information. This Court must recognize the critical need for law enforcement to preserve 
evidence of confessions. 
IV. THE DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
FOR A MIRANDA VIOLATION 
Detective Thomas called Riqo Perea on the telephone while investigating the case. R. 
1909:236, 228; 1926:11. Riqo told the detective that he would not come in and "that he 
needed to speak with a lawyer first before he came in. ... He told me he got screwed the 
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last time he spoke with cops and he was innocent." R. 1909:247-48, 236, 1910:23, 25, 36; 
1926:12. Riqo was subsequently Mirandized, according to officers, during the 
interrogation in which he waived his rights. R. 1909:208; 1926:86. Riqo clearly invoked 
his right to counsel prior to the interrogation and prior to being in custody. 
A. A Defendant Can Anticipatorily Invoke His Right to Counsel 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court said: 
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this 
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any 
statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the 
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. 
Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has reasoned that these prophylactic 
rules are necessary to limit the compulsion in interrogations. Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Supreme Court emphasized a 
"bright-line" rule in Miranda invocations: 
[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 
Id, at 484-85 (emphasis added). 
This bright line rule "provid[es] 'clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law 
enforcement profession." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988). It is also 
"designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously 
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asserted Miranda rights." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). If an accused has 
"expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without 
legal advice, a later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement without 
counsel's presence may properly be viewed with skepticism." Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 
(quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110, n. 2 (1975) (White, J. concurring)). "This 
discomfort is precisely the state of mind that Edwards presumes to persist unless the 
suspect himself initiates further conversation. . . ." Id. at 684. "[T]o a suspect who has 
indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting 
counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely 
exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling." Id. at 686. 
Most courts acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has not decided 
the issue of whether a defendant can anticipatorily invoke his Fifth Amendment rights 
pre-custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1160, 115 S. Ct. 1122, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1085 (1995); People v. 
Villalobos, 131 N.E. 2d 639, 642 (111. 2000); Russell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. 
App. 2007). However, many courts cite dicta from a footnote in McNeil for the 
proposition that defendants may not invoke their rights outside of the custodial setting. 
See, e.g., Redman, 34 F.3d at 1248. The footnote says: 
The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely be circumvented 
when, "in future preliminary hearings, competent counsel ... make sure that they, 
or their clients, make a statement on the record' invoking the Miranda right to 
counsel. We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights 
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anticipatorily, in a context other than "custodial interrogation"—which a 
preliminary hearing will not always, or even usually, involve. If the Miranda right 
to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no 
logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed 
even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights must be asserted when the 
government seeks to take the action they protect against. The fact that we have 
allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to 
future custodial interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be 
asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with similar future 
effect. Assuming, however, that an assertion at arraignment would be effective, 
and would be routinely made, the mere fact that adherence to the principle of our 
decisions will not have substantial consequences is no reason to abandon that 
principle. It would remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed 
no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable. 
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3 (internal citations omitted). 
McNeil does not stand for the proposition that one cannot anticipatorily invoke 
constitutional rights. McNeil appeared in court, with counsel, at a bail hearing. Id. at 174. 
Later that evening, police interrogated him on a different charge which he confessed to 
after Miranda warnings. Id. McNeil argued that his appearance with counsel constituted 
an invocation of the right to counsel on any other offense. Id. at 174-75. The Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that the invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
"requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police. Requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does 
not bear that construction." Id. at 178 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court in 
McNeil never focused its analysis on the time or the place in which a defendant asserted 
his right to counsel. Rather, the only issue of importance was that McNeil never actually 
expressly asserted a right to counsel. 
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The footnote seems to imply that one cannot invoke the right to counsel prior to 
custodial interrogation. However, this reasoning is misplaced. First, the footnote is 
clearly dicta, since the Court's analysis weighed entirely on McNeil's lack of invocation 
of his right to counsel. In fact, most courts acknowledge the footnote as dicta. See, e.g., 
United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barnett, 
814 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (D. Alaska 1992); Sauerheber v. Indiana, 698 N.E.2d 796, 802 
(Ind. 1998). Second, the footnote does not stand for the proposition that a defendant 
cannot affirmatively invoke his right to counsel prior to interrogation—it only 
acknowledges the existence of an issue yet to be decided. Third, in McNeil, the dissent 
argued that McNeil did, in fact, invoke his right to counsel. Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ). The footnote constitutes a response to 
the dissent's argument that lawyers would circumvent the Court's ruling by expressly 
invoking the right to counsel at preliminary hearings. In response, the Court says that 
these invocations would likely be ineffective since they are not made in "the context" of 
custodial interrogations. However, the Court's response does not address the situation in 
which a defendant happens to invoke his rights in "the context" of interrogations, like the 
case at hand, rather than at a preliminary hearing. In other words, the Court's footnote has 
little to do with the specific issue in this case: whether a defendant, acting alone and 
without counsel, can invoke his right to counsel when specifically asked by the police to 
come in for an interrogation. 
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McNeil itself, in the majority opinion, supports the proposition that a person could 
expressly invoke the right to counsel prior to interrogation: the Edwards rule "requires, at 
a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a 
desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the 
police" Id. at 178 (emphasis in original). McNeil supports an argument that if a person 
indicates, at any time, that he wants an attorney's help in dealing with custodial 
interrogation, then the Edwards rule would apply. In fact, the Court said that the purpose 
of the Edwards rule, and a suspect's invocation of it, is to express the suspect's "desire to 
deal with the police only through counsel." Id. 
Additionally, the footnote contradicts much of the Court's prior jurisprudence on 
this issue. In Miranda, the Supreme Court said that "a pre-interrogation request for a 
lawyer ... affirmatively secures his right to [an attorney] ...." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
Additionally, the Court said that if a defendant requests counsel "in any manner and at 
any stage of the process" then "there can be no questioning." Id. at 444-45. The Court has 
rejected as "plainly wrong" the position "that the authorities need not stop their questions 
if an accused requests counsel prior to or during the Miranda warnings," reasoning that 
M[a] request for counsel coming at any stage of the process requires that questioning cease 
until counsel has been provided." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97 n.6, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 
L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The 
Court stated that "[w]hat matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the 
defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the 
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interrogation ..." Montejo v. Louisiana, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 955, 970 (2009) (emphasis added). 
Some courts have held that defendants may invoke the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel pre-interrogation, so long as the interrogation was "imminent."56 For example, in 
United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991), the police searched the 
defendant's home. Id. at 1197-98. He repeatedly asked for counsel and was subsequently 
taken into custody, given Miranda and interrogated. Id. at 1198. The fact that Kelsey 
invoked his right to counsel before the police were required to Mirandize him was 
"irrelevant," the Court said, since the Edwards rule is triggered by "some statement that 
can reasonably be construed to be expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney 
in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police" Id. at 1199 (quoting McNeil, 501 
U.S. at 178). Since Kelsey expressly asked for counsel in dealing upcoming police 
interrogation, he successfully met that requirement. 
A person who asks for counsel to help him in interrogation "considers himself 
unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance." Id. 
(quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683); cf, North Carolina v. Torres, 412 S.E.2d 20, 25 
56
 See United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1994) ("in order for a 
defendant to invoke his Miranda rights the authorities must be conducting interrogation, 
or interrogation must be imminent"); People v. Nguyen, 132 Cal. App. 4th 350, 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("[A] suspect may invoke Miranda's protections if 
custodial interrogation is impending or imminent"); United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 
1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1998) (''Miranda rights may be invoked only during custodial 
interrogation or when interrogation is imminent"); Villalobos, 131 N.E.2d at 646 ("[T]he 
suspect must invoke the right to counsel during custodial interrogation or when custodial 
interrogation was imminent"). 
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(N.C. 1992) ("Thus, although an individual cannot waive her right to counsel prior to 
receiving Miranda warnings, a suspect in custody can certainly assert her right to have 
counsel present during her impending interrogation prior to Miranda warnings and the 
actual onset of questioning") (emphasis in original); Nguyen, 132 Cal. App. 4* at 394-95 
("We do not suggest defendant must await a police officer's formal recitation of the 
Miranda admonition before invoking the right to counsel"); State v. Kramer, 720 N.W.2d 
459, 464 (Wis. App. 2006) ("there might be situations where a request for counsel at the 
conclusion of a standoff situation is so intertwined with imminent interrogation that the 
invocation should be honored"). See also United States v. Goodson, 22 M.J. 22, 23 
(CM.A. 1986) (holding that a defendant's repeated requests for an attorney pre-
interrogation had the "effect" of bringing Edwards "into play"); Pecina v. Texas, 326 
N.W.3d 249, 265 (Tex. App. 2010) ("To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, the police still may not initiate custodial interrogation of a suspect 
who has previously requested assistance of counsel"). 
Several policy reasons justify allowing defendants facing custodial interrogation to 
anticipatorily invoke their right to counsel. Without such a rule, the police could freely 
interrogate a person, who as they arrest him, asserts that he wants a lawyer—so long as 
the police merely interrogate him later. Unfortunately, ordinary people are not as 
sophisticated as lawyers, and a person, who when confronted by the police after invoking 
their rights, would only assume that the police are ignoring or denying them that right. 
The Supreme Court explicitly supported this reasoning: 
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"Although judges and lawyers may understand and appreciate the subtle 
distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the average 
person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police 
officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; 
he therefore should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes 
he is seeking counsel... . The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney 
indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his 
adversaries singlehandedly." 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 n. 7 (1986) (citations omitted) (overruled on 
Sixth Amendment grounds, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)). 
Additionally, Miranda attempted to "give concrete constitutional guidelines for 
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680 (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42). The rule is simple: if a defendant asks to deal with 
custodial interrogation only through a lawyer, then the police may not do so—even if 
such a request comes before the defendant is actually taken into custody. 
In this case, there is no question that Riqo expressly invoked his right to counsel. 
Critically, Riqo invoked this right in the context of an anticipated interrogation. The 
officer asked him to come in and talk with him—an interrogation. Riqo indicated that the 
last time he was interrogated, he was screwed. The conversation revolved entirely around 
an anticipated interrogation and Riqo expressly indicated that it was his desire to "deal 
with the police only through counsel." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. In such a scenario, the 
defendant certainly can indicate to the police that it is his desire to have an attorney 
present during any questioning and the police must honor this request. 
Hence, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Perea's motion to suppress the 
confession for a Miranda violation. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY LIMITED MR- PEREA'S ABILITY 
TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY FAILING TO PROHIBIT OFFICERS FROM 
DISCLOSING THE IDENTITIES OF ANONYMOUS WITNESSES 
Prior to trial, several witnesses approached defense counsel indicating they would 
testify that Riqo was not the shooter and that another person had confessed to the 
shooting, so long as they could testify anonymously because of fears for their safety. R. 
1915:15-16. Their fears were not unfounded: one man, Paul Ashton, was kidnapped, 
taken to a parking lot and shot in retaliation for the shooting. R. 1915:14. Riqo's 
grandmother's house was shot at two times. Id. The day of the preliminary hearing, 
Riqo's mother and sister were attacked and "severely beaten" in the courthouse elevator. 
Id. One other person was charged with aggravated assault against a member of Riqo's 
family. R. 1914:15; 1915:20. The State admitted that retaliation and gang violence was a 
"very real issue in this case." R. 1914:19. 
Defense counsel proposed closing the courtroom to the public for their testimony, 
which the court said seemed drastic. R. 1915:18-20. He also proposed turning their names 
over to the State and to law enforcement, but with the proviso that law enforcement not 
disclose their names to others, reasoning that if that happened, witnesses would either 
change their stories or be harmed. R. 1915:65-66. The court refused to "put that kind of 
limit on" their investigation, reasoning that law enforcement had "to have some latitude 
... to talk to these witnesses and follow up on the information ... they get...." R. 
1915:60. The court said it was "blown away" that these witnesses lacked "moral courage" 
and had "no backbone, no spine ..." to talk with the police about what they saw. R 
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1915:34-35. The court ruled that defendant could only call these witnesses if he allowed 
law enforcement to investigate their claims: "if these people are not willing to give their 
identity to the prosecutors and [let] law enforcement follow up on what they are going to 
say, then they are not going to testify." R 1915:62. Defense counsel reiterated that "we 
are there" if law enforcement would not leak the names on the street, but the court 
refused to give that order. R. 1915:66. 
The State then moved to disqualify defense counsel, "conceding to a Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel issue," because in its opinion, defense 
counsel treated exculpatory witnesses identities as deserving of greater protection than 
his client's right to a defense. R. 1112; 1916:13. Defense counsel indicated he would not 
call the witnesses because they would change their stories once he turned their 
information over to law enforcement. R. 1916:17-18, 1918:40; 1916:20. Riqo 
subsequently waived the conflict and never called the witnesses at trial. R. 1916:65-66; 
1918:1-20,26-32,36-40. 
Ultimately, the trial court erroneously failed to take critical steps necessary to 
protect these individuals and its failure to do so deprived the defendant of an opportunity 
to present crucial evidence in his defense. 
Criminal defendants must be "afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). The Sixth 
Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause grants criminal defendants the right to call 
"witnesses in his favor" and applies to the States through the 14th Amendment. U.S. 
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Const. Amend. VI; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). A defendant must be 
allowed an opportunity to call witnesses in his favor, as a "fundamental element of due 
process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). Courts may not interfere 
with a defendant's constitutional right to call witnesses who are "material and favorable 
to his defense." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982); 
Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 23 (finding violation of the right to present a defense 
because trial court excluded "testimony ... relevant and material to the defense"). 
A. Witness Intimidation Requires Judicial Remedies 
Witness intimidation severely affects the authority of the criminal justice system. 
See Judge Joan Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses 
Versus a Defendant's Right of Confrontation: The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1165, 1194-1204 (2002). Because of intimidation, witnesses may not 
come forward or refuse to testify, witnesses may be physically harmed or killed, and may 
be prevented from cooperating with the police. Id. at 1194-95. One court noted "the 
serious nature and magnitude of the problem of witness intimidation." Alvarado v. 
Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 (Cal. 2000). Gangs, in particular, may use methods such 
as "public humiliation, assault, or even execution of victims or witnesses, or members of 
their families, as well as public acts of extreme brutality that are meant to terrify potential 
witnesses." Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity at 1195; see also Nora V. 
Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or Other 
Options?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 644 (Supp. 1998) (noting gang cases particularly 
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involve witness intimidation). Other methods include "threats of physical violence 
against a witness's mother, children, or spouse. Threats may be communicated by drive-
by shootings into the witness's home, fire bombings of cars, house burnings, or any other 
form of violent activity." Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity at 1198. 
Gang members also have intimidated witnesses in the courtroom. Id. at 1198-99 
citing Peter Finn & Kerry Murphy Healey, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Preventing Gang-and 
Drug-Related Witness Intimidation 1, 7 (1996). In a U.S. Department of Justice Survey, 
74% of prosecutor's offices reported declining to pursue cases to trial because of witness 
intimidation. Id. at 1204 (citing Carol J. DeFrances et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
Prosecutors in State Courts, 1994, at 1 (1996)). 92% of prosecutor's offices had to 
dismiss cases because of fear of retribution or actual threats to witnesses. Id. "Prosecutors 
estimated intimidation in 75% to 100% of cases that involved violent crimes in gang 
areas." Id. Gang members, in particular, enforce a strong code of silence, which frightens 
many witnesses to such a degree that they refuse to come forward. Laura Perry, What's in 
a Name?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1563, 1579-82 (2009); see also Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 222, 
n. 15 ("The use of violence and intimidation by criminal gangs to immunize themselves 
from the criminal justice system is by no means a recent phenomenon"). 
In this case, the witnesses had legitimate concerns. Witnesses had been kidnapped, 
shot, shot at, and actually attacked in the courtroom. The threat of violence in this case 
was very real and it demanded the court take extraordinary measures. The trial court had 
a simple obligation: to protect the witnesses. The solution would have been easy. The 
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State and law enforcement would have had these individuals' names with which they 
could run criminal histories and do limited investigation in order to prepare for cross-
examination. The court, then, could have 1) held an in camera hearing in which it could 
have assessed the legitimacy of the witnesses' concerns and the necessity for anonymous 
testimony;57 2) closed the relevant testimony to the public;58 3) granted the witnesses a 
degree of anonymity;59 4) or even limited the State's ability to cross-examine. 
The court had several options for limiting witness disclosure at its disposal. For 
example, one appellate court held that the complete anonymity of certain witnesses 
violated a defendant's right to confrontation, however, the State could refuse to disclose 
their identities until the moment they took the stand. People v. Wheaton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 
1348, 1356-57, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 423-24 (Cal. App. 4th 1995). In another case, 
because of threats to a victim, the court properly allowed her to be questioned outside the 
presence of the defendant, his counsel or the prosecutor. People v. Perkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d 
" State v. Keeton, 573 N.W.2d 378, 381-82 (Minn. App. 1997) (not erroneous for the 
trial court to hold an in camera hearing without the defendant, his counsel or the 
prosecutor, to assess the intimidation against a witness claiming anonymity). 
58
 Demleitner, Witness Protection, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. at 655-60; Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 222 
(finding that closing court to the public would help prevent witness intimidation). 
59
 Alvarado v. Purge, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46708, 2006 WL 1840020 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) ("Testifying by giving an identifying number rather than a name does not 
necessarily curtail any trial rights. The cross-examiner can question the witness' activities 
in the buy-and-bust operation without regard to the witness' name, and similarly has an 
opportunity to see and hear that which he testifies about"); Harbison v. Little, 511 F. 
Supp. 2d 872, 887 n.l 1 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (witnesses testified anonymously behind a 
screen). 
60
 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) ("trial judges retain wide latitude 
... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about... 
harassment [or] ... the witness' safety"). 
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273, 275 (Sup. Ct. 1999). In Perkins, defense counsel had to submit written questions for 
the witness, which were posed to her by the court, transcribed, sealed and were deemed to 
be admissible at a subsequent trial against the defendant. Id. at 275, 277. The court could 
also have prevented the witnesses from being seen. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
844 (1990) ("We have never held, however, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees 
criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against 
them at trial.") 
Closing the courtroom constitutes a relatively simple and non-invasive tactic that 
not only protects witnesses from intimidation but also would not have violated the 
defendant's rights.61 First, Mr. Perea was willing to absent himself during the witnesses' 
testimony, thus waiving any objection he had to a public trial. R. 1915:18. Second, 
closure can be a critical remedy if it impacts a defendant's ability to present his defense. 
For example, in Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 
(1956), the defendant sought to present evidence that her husband had forced her to 
commit abnormally shocking sexual acts., Id. at 165. Because this testimony would have 
affected her "physically and emotionally," the trial court properly closed her testimony to 
the public. Id. at 169. In State v. Poindexter, 92 So.2d 390 (La. 1956), similar to Mr. 
Perea's case, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the judge 
61
 A public trial "is necessarily for the benefit of the accused, that the public may see that 
he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested 
spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the 
importance of their functions ..." Moore v. State, 108 S.E. 47, 50 (Ga. 1921). Closing the 
courtroom arguably only impacts the defendant's rights—a right he was willing to waive 
in this case to ensure he could present his defense. R. 1915:18. 
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opined that he lacked the discretion to close the courtroom in order to protect a witness 
who felt he could not testify freely if prison personnel were present. The court disagreed: 
It is well settled in the jurisprudence of the United States that a trial judge may, in 
his discretion, exclude spectators from the courtroom while the testimony of a 
witness in a criminal case is being taken if such a step appears reasonably 
necessary to prevent the embarrassment or emotional disturbance of the witness or 
to enable the witness to testify to facts material to the case. 
Id. at 391-92.62 In Commonwealth v. Principal, 104 A. 53 (Pa. 1918), the defendant 
sought to introduce a witness who would testify that the victim had threatened to kill the 
defendant previously. Id. at 57-58. However, this man would not testify if other Italians 
were in the courtroom, because he feared retaliation for his testimony. Id. The judge 
denied the request, reasoning that he had no power to close the courtroom. Id. The 
appellate court disagreed, reasoning that the court should have closed the courtroom to 
protect the witness. Id.; see also Hogan v. State, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ark. 1935) (trial 
court did not err in closing the courtroom to protect witness who was "greatly 
embarrassed and emotionally disturbed" during her testimony). Closure has frequently 
been used as a remedy to protect fearful or intimidated witnesses.63 
oz
 See also People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (N.Y. 1954) ("It has uniformly 
been held to be subject to the inherent power of the court [to close the courtroom] ... to 
protect the rights of parties and witnesses, and generally to further the administration of 
justice" (citing Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts [1931], § 262, pp. 296-297; 6 
Wigmore, op. cit., p. 338; 1 Bentham, op. cit, p. 541 et seq.); Moore, 108 S.E. 47; State 
v. Hinton, 286 N.E.2d 265, 266 (N.Y. 1972) ("a trial court has [well-settled and] inherent 
power to exclude the public from the courtroom in a criminal case ... [ifj a witness would 
be unnecessarily embarrassed ..."). 
63
 United States ex rel Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 126-28 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, 
denied, 397 U.S. 957, 90 S. Ct. 947, 25 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1970) (court did not err in clearing 
courtroom for one day to protect witness from intimidation from spectators); Harris v. 
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A defendant is not denied a public trial if a courtroom is closed to protect a 
witness. People v. Hagan, 248 N.E.2d 588, cert, denied, 396 U.S. 886, 90 S. Ct. 173, 24 
L. Ed. 2d 161 (1969). In Hagan the defendants allegedly assassinated Malcolm X. The 
court excluded spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of one witness who 
claimed that he had been threatened and that he "believed his life was in danger if he 
testified publicly and would refuse to testify on this ground." Id. at 589. According to the 
court, because the "witness feared for his life, and threats had been made against him, and 
he was not going to testify," the exclusion of spectators from the courtroom during his 
testimony, which was a "small segment of the trial," did not deprive defendants of their 
right to a 'public trial'" Id. at 589, 590. 
However, in this case the trial court chose none of these actions. Instead it chose 
to require the defendant to turn over the names of these people and to allow law 
enforcement to investigate their claims—-thereby exposing these witnesses to extreme 
danger. It did all of this without assessing the serious potential for harm to these 
Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 964, 87 S. Ct. 1040, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1967) (defendant's claim that courtroom was improperly closed to 
protect rape victim was "spurious"); United States ex rel Smallwood v. LaValle, 371 F. 
Supp. 1148, 1153 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 
U.S. 920, 95 S. Ct. 1586, 43 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1975) ("the health and safety of the witness 
and the rights of the defendant seem much better served by careful inquiry to determine 
the need for the witness's testimony and the witness's inability to testify in public, 
followed by an exclusion order that is limited in time to the witness's testimony only and 
otherwise operates, where possible, to minimize the impact on the defendant's rights"); 
Hogan v. State, 86 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ark. 1935) (court properly closed courtroom for ten 
minutes for "terribly frightened and embarrassed" witness to testify); Lowe v. State, 233 
S.E.2d 807, 808-09 (Ga. App. 1977) (no abuse of discretion for court to exclude 
spectators "for the next few minutes" while rape victim, who "feared possible bodily 
harm" from spectators in the courtroom, testified). 
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individuals. As defense counsel pointed out, this approach eviscerated his ability to call 
the witnesses, because once their identities were known, they would not be likely to 
testify for Mr. Perea. R. 1915:62; 1916:20. The potential for devastation to Mr. Perea's 
case was enormous. Several witnesses were willing to testify that Riqo was not the 
shooter. The court's ruling, in essence, deprived him of this critical testimony. 
Courts have repeatedly allowed witnesses to not divulge their identities out of fear 
of retaliation from the defendant—and these situations deal with a potential violation of 
the defendant's right to confrontation.64 For example, in United States v. Palermo, 410 
F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969) the court held that the defendant did not have a right to 
witnesses' names and addresses if a genuine threat to their safety existed. 
Commentators have frequently advocated the use of anonymous testimony to 
protect witnesses.65 In People v. Pryor, 668 N.E.2d 1090 (111. App. 1996), witnesses' 
04
 See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813-15 (10th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 
924-26 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Cavallaro, 553 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977) (witness's safety justified denying defendant 
witness's address); United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976) (allowing 
nondisclosure of a government informant to protect the witness's cover); United States v. 
Jordan, 466 F.2d 99, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding the nondisclosure of the names of 
two witnesses to a knife attack in jail); United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 
1972) (allowing the nondisclosure of a government agent's identity because "[t]he 
incriminating transaction was observed by police officers, and the relevance of the 
personal history of the undercover agent was questionable"). But see State v. Bonza, 269 
P. 480 (Utah 1928), in which this Court held that a defendant's right to confrontation was 
violated by closing the courtroom during a witness's testimony. Bonza is inapplicable to 
the case at hand, since it was the defendant in this case who sought closure. 
65
 Demleitner, Witness Protection, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. at 660-64; Comparet-Cassani, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 1239-43; Laura Perry, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. at 1587-89 (calling 
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anonymous testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation, specifically 
when he waived his presence during their testimony. Id. at 1093-94. Nor is a witness's 
identity always critical for cross-examination. Nelson v. Crowley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18291, 2009 WL 498909, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("No clearly established law interpreting 
the Confrontation Clause required that Petitioner be provided with the Undercover's 
name in order to facilitate cross-examination bearing on his general credibility"). Merely 
having the witness's true name may be enough of a basis to allow for adequate cross-
examination. Marshall v. Florida, 604 So.2d 799, 802-03 (Fla. 1992) (not erroneous for 
court to allow witness to testify anonymously since defendant knew witness's true name). 
In one federal case, the United States used anonymous witness testimony to 
establish that the defendants murdered another individual. United States v. White, 116 
F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Witnesses had been threatened, assaulted, and even 
murdered—much like the case at hand. Id. at 913. The defendants wanted disclosure of 
the witness's identities "to conduct independent investigations on their credibility and 
call either the witnesses or the defense investigators." Id. at 914. The defendants, at a 
minimum, wanted the witness's identities disclosed after jury voir dire. The court 
disagreed: "identification of the murder witnesses at any time before their trial testimony 
would have ... seriously increased the risks to the witnesses." Id. at 915. Disclosure of 
for a four-pronged "sliding scale" in which a witness's identity could be hidden at various 
levels, depending on the level of threat); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting 
Event or Quest for Truth, 3 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 292-295 (1963) ("In the rare case, the 
denial of all discovery may be compelled to protect the safety of witnesses or prevent 
apparent perversion of the judicial process"). 
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their identities, prior to trial, the court reasoned, "would have [made the witnesses] open 
to threats and other tactics designed to obtain their silence." Id. 
B. Policy Reasons Favor Protecting Witnesses from Intimidation 
Several policy reasons justify protecting witnesses' identity when there are serious 
concerns about violence. First, we need an effective criminal justice system in which 
citizens have confidence in its reliability. Witness intimidation undermines the system's 
integrity and produces a vicious cycle in which people lack the confidence to speak with 
the police or the courts. Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity at 1227. 
Second, we want to encourage citizens to report criminal activity to the police. 
If law enforcement fails to protect those who come forward with information 
about criminal activity even after they are attacked and threatened, other citizens 
will be discouraged from reporting future criminal activity. Requiring disclosure 
of a threatened witness's identity will weaken other citizens1 resolve to perform 
their civic and moral duty to report crime. This result is contrary to the important 
policy goal of encouraging citizens to report crime. 
Id. In fact, citizens have a Constitutional right to report wrongdoing. In Re Quarles, 158 
U.S. 532, 536-37 (1895) ("The necessary conclusion is, that it is the right of every private 
citizen of the United States to inform a marshal... of a violation of the ... laws of the 
United States; that this right is secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United 
States ... "). Any governmental interference on a witness's ability to report a crime 
arguably affects that citizen's constitutional duty to inform the police of unlawful 
behavior. "[I]t would be unconscionable for government to impose duties and obligations 
on its citizenry, exposing them to the possibility of harm or danger, and then fail to assist 
73 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
them." Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity at 1236; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 
U.S. 651, 662 (1884) ("it is the duty of that government to see that [a citizen] may 
exercise [his] right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account 
of so doing"). Witnesses who face intimidation have three choices: 
They can testify truthfully, risking retaliation. They can refuse to testify, thereby 
risking being in contempt of court, or they can commit perjury by exonerating the 
defendants. The latter choice is becoming more common as witness intimidation 
increases. 
Tara C. Kowalski, Alvarado v. Superior Court: A Death Sentence for Government 
Witnesses, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 223 (2001). 
A third policy concern involves the safety of the witnesses at hand. If courts do 
little to guarantee witness safety, we expose them to potentially violent consequences. Id. 
Justice O'Connor opined that "most people would think that witnesses to a gang-related 
murder likely would be unwilling to speak to the [FBI] except on the condition of 
confidentiality." Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993). Even prisoners 
have a right to be protected against violence and government has a duty to protect them 
from it. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892).66 If prisoners have a 
Constitutional right to governmental protection from violence, then witnesses clearly 
have an equal, if not superior, right. As one court said: 
66
 "The United States, having the absolute right to hold such prisoners, have an equal 
duty to protect them, while so held, against assault or injury from any quarter. The 
existence of that duty on the part of the government necessarily implies a corresponding 
right of the prisoners to be so protected; and this right of the prisoners is a right secured 
to them by the Constitution ...." Id. 
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Society reaps enormous benefits when a witness's testimony succeeds in getting a 
criminal off the street and placed behind bars. Society must be willing to pay for 
that benefit by affording necessary protection to both the witness and his family, 
for the threat of violence against a witness's family will often silence the witness. 
Without a continuing and visible public commitment to such protection, it is 
unrealistic to expect citizens to come forward and provide information so critical 
to the successful operation of the criminal justice system. To the extent that 
government fails to meet this essential responsibility, it cedes control of our cities 
to the criminals. 
Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Fourth, allowing witness anonymity helps foster for effective law enforcement. 
For example, the State frequently uses informants, and refuses to disclose their identities, 
on the grounds that disclosure will limit their ability to use that witness in the future, and 
that it may lead to future harm. Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity at 1227. 
Lastly, it is the defendant whose rights might be violated by non-disclosure of a witness's 
identification since it would arguably affect his Constitutional right to confront the 
witnesses against him. However, the State does not possess a concurrent right to 
confrontation. 
Government has a duty to protect its citizens from the malfeasance of those who 
would intimidate witnesses and corrupt the judicial process: 
To hold that the liberty of [individuals]... must be forfeited to preserve the illusion 
of freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a whole 
is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the whole of its 
sense. The freedom to leave one's house and move about at will, and to have a 
measure of personal security is "implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty1" 
Citing Landano, 508 U.S. at 179-81; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-10 
(1966); United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Toombs, 497 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Twomey, 460 F.2d 400, 401-03 
(7th Cir. 1972); Ellis, 468 F.2d at 639; Palermo, 410 F.2d at 472-73. 
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enshrined in the history and basic constitutional documents of English-speaking 
people. Preserving the peace is the first duty of government, and it is for the 
protection of the community from predations of the idle, the contentious and the 
brutal that government was invented. 
People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, 928 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)). 
Accordingly, Mr. Perea contends that the trial court erroneously compromised the 
safety of the witnesses by requiring the defense to turn over their names for law 
enforcement investigation, thereby exposing them to great personal risk. Because of that 
order, Mr. Perea chose not to turn over the names and not to present perhaps the most 
critical aspect of his defense. He chose this because, as his counsel pointed out to the 
court, the witnesses would conveniently forget their testimony or would act to preserve 
themselves if their anonymity was not guaranteed by the court. R. 1915:62; 1916:20. 
The threat of violence against these witnesses was extremely real. The trial court 
took no steps to assess the reality of the problem, nor did it take any steps necessary to 
protect the witnesses. In fact, the court repeatedly commented on the witnesses' lack of 
courage to come forward, impugning their bravery. R. 1915:34-35, 62. The court's ruling 
deprived Mr. Perea of a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. 
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VI. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWS FOR 
THE IMPOSITION OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR A NINETEEN-YEAR-
OLD WITH AN IQ OF 77 IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT, UNNECESSARY RIGOR AND GUARANTEES OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 
Riqo Perea's Background. By all accounts, Riqo Perea was a troubled kid. 
According to Dr. Ronald Houston, a clinical psychologist, Riqo was born into a gang and 
raised by his gang-member mother. R. 1909:60. Riqo's mother used alcohol and drugs 
during pregnancy. R. 1909:315 38, 148. She fed Riqo alcohol in a bottle and gave him 
marijuana at age three. R. 1909:55. He drank alcohol prior to age six and frequently 
witnessed his mother engaging in sexual acts with various boyfriends. R. 1909:55-56. As 
a child, Riqo was hyperactive and uncontrollable. R. 1909:31. In kindergarten, Riqo 
manifested speech and language problems. R. 1909:31. Because of "chaotic parenting," 
Riqo was forced largely to raise himself. R. 1909:148, 37. He moved from school to 
school and place to place, always in high-crime, high poverty areas. R. 1909:43-51, 57. In 
school, Riqo was placed in courses for low-functioning children. R. 1909:32. Dr. Stephen 
Golding characterized this as an "extremely traumatic and neglectful childhood." R. 
1909:148. 
The dominant male figures in Riqo's life were gang members. R. 1909:60, 97. 
When he was in the fourth grade, Riqo joined his mother's gang, Central City Local 
Ogden Trece. R. 1909:124, 152. As a peewee member of the gang, Riqo participated in 
thefts, selling and using drugs, and some shooting. R. 1909:125. The gang became Riqo's 
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"surrogate family/' and pressured him to live up to the gang's standards. R. 1909:116, 
119. Riqo indicated he was "down in the hood 113 percent." R. 1909:128. 
When Riqo underwent residential treatment, he stopped using drugs and alcohol 
and was involved in athletics and his education. R. 1909:91, 153. But when Riqo left 
these programs, returned to gang life. R. 1909:97. "Membership [in a gang] ... afforded 
[Riqo] a level of social status that he has not been able to otherwise obtain through 
intellectual, academic and or athletic accomplishment." R. 1909:99. 
According to Dr. Houston, Riqo's intellectual functioning was barely above that of 
mental retardation. R. 1909:104. His IQ tested at 77 and he manifested clear "organic 
disfunction." R. 1909:33. 94% of people who take an IQ test have a higher result than 
Riqo. R. 1909:34. Riqo also showed clear signs of ADHD. R. 1909:35-36. "It's sufficient 
to say at gross level that there is a level of immaturity that's characteristic of an 
adolescent... compared to a normal adolescent or a normal adult." R. 1909:43. 
Dr. Houston testified that although Riqo was physically 19 years old, in terms of brain 
development, he "clearly" was under the age of 18, but not as low as 14. R. 1909:43. 
Riqo's age equivalent on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test was age 15 on one part 
and age 10 or 11 on the other. R. 1909:58. Because Riqo had difficulty with organic brain 
sampling, Dr. Houston opined that Riqo would have "an inability or difficulty deficit" to 
comply with rule-governed behavior—he would be much more likely to be impulsive. R. 
1909:69, 84-87. 
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Dr. Stephen Golding, a forensic psychologist, disagreed with some of Dr. 
Houston's findings, but admitted he never tested Riqo.R. 1909:152, 154-65, 175-76. 
However, Dr. Golding agreed that his diagnoses would increase Riqo's impulsivity, and 
that Riqo's performance on the standardized testing was "in the toilet." R. 1909:181-82; 
190-91. 
A, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 Violates Guarantees of Equal 
Protection and Due Process 
The Utah Legislature recently changed the murder sentencing statute. The statute 
states the following: 
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony 
aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court. 
(2) The sentence under this section shall be life in prison without parole or an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 (2009). The statute is unconstitutionally vague, since it 
gives no guidance to the trial court about which situations would merit a sentence of life 
without parole and which would merit 25 years to life. 
Legislative History. The legislature passed this statute in order to simplify 
aggravated murder prosecutions in which the death penalty was not specifically sought.6 
According to the bill's sponsor, seeking life without parole as opposed to death would 
S.B. 114, 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007); Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on 
S.B. 116 Before the H Jud Comm., 2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007); Aggravated 
Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. 116 Before the S. Jud., L. Enf, and Crim. J. 
Comm.., 2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007); Aggravated Murder Amendments, 
Floor Debates, S.B. 116, 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007), 
http://le.utah.gov/^ 
The prior statute required life without parole to be decided by the jury. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207(5)(c) (2003). 
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save counties enormous costs by not having to have twelve-person juries, hire Rule 8 
qualified counsel, hire mitigation specialists and the like.69 Without death on the table, 
the bill's sponsor opined that there was no longer a need for a "higher standard" in which 
the State has to "jump through quite the hurdles."70 The State was "being too careful 
when [it] didn't need to be," he said.71 
One Senator thought that life without parole seemed to be fundamentally 
79 
different. Paul Boy den, head of the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, said that the 
statute was a "trade-off," but that "it makes it so much easier if you handle [life without 
parole the same] as every other felony." According to the bill's sponsor, "everyone 
knows" that the defendant will receive life without parole and "and we're just required by 
caselaw and statute to do it this certain way. It does not make sense."74 
The legislature eliminated the requirement that a jury find the existence of a 
sentence of life without parole through a series of carefully crafted factors (or, as the 
Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. 116 Before the H. Jud. Comm., 
2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory Bell). The head of 
the Statewide Association of Prosecutors, Paul Boy den, said that the primary motivation 
behind the bill was to "save expenses" since death penalty procedures can "break a small 
county." Id. (statement of Paul Boy den). 
70
 Aggravated Murder Amendments, Senate: Second Reading, S.B. 116, 2007 Gen. Sess. 
(Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory Bell). 
71
 Aggravated Murder Amendments, Senate: Third Reading, S.B. 116, 2007 Gen. Sess. 
(Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory Bell). 
12
 Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. 116 Before the S. Jud., L. Enf, and 
Crim. J. Comm.., 2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Ross 
Romero). 
73
 Id. (statement of Paul Boy den). 
74
 Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. 116 Before the H. Jud. Comm., 
2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory Bell). 
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bill's sponsor called them: "drawn-out" "extraordinary steps" ) and instead decided to 
shorten and shortcut the process to merely require the judge to sentence someone to life 
or twenty-five years to life. The lack of legislative guidance violates state and federal 
guarantees of due process, equal protection and prohibitions against cruel and unusual 
punishments. 
1. Section 76-3-207.7 is Unconstitutionally Vague Because it 
Authorizes Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement 
"It is a fundamental tenet of due process that 'no one may be required at peril of 
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.'" United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 
(1939)). A statute may be unconstitutionally vague if it is written in a way that 
"authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 31, 57 P.3d 977; see 
also Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm n, 2009 UT 73, \ 54, 225 P.3d 153 (citing City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)). 
The vagueness doctrine requires the legislature to define criminal standards in 
order to minimize the discretion of executive and judicial branch actors to pursue their 
"personal predilections" in the enforcement and application of the law. Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). Statutes are not vague, so long as they "mark 
boundaries sufficiently distinct forjudges and juries fairly to administer the law." State v. 
Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah 1989) (quoting 21 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 17, at 130 
_ _ 
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(1981)). As such, laws must be defined "with sufficient precision to permit uniform 
interpretation and application by those charged with enforcing them." State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042, 1050 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). In fact, "vague sentencing 
provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the 
consequences of violating a given criminal statute." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 clearly punishes two classes of aggravated 
murderers: some will merit life without parole and others will merit twenty-five years to 
life. However, the statute contains no list of aggravating and mitigating factors to assist in 
determining which individuals deserve parole and which do not—which would be an 
easy way to avoid a vagueness problem.76 The statute fails to identify a standard of proof. 
It gives no guidance to the court to enable it to determine when a particular sentence 
Sentencing schemes must not be vague, and they avoid these problems when they 
require courts to balance aggravating and mitigating factors: 
As to sentencing decisions, aggravating factors must meet two requirements: 
First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it 
must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. Second, the 
aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. 
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); see also Honie, 2002 UT 4 at f 55-58 
(applying this analysis to a rape statute). See also Bell, 754 P.2d at 57-59 (holding that 
minimum mandatory sentence was not void for vagueness because the statute required 
the court to consider several aggravating and mitigating factors); see also State v. Egbert, 
748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987) (finding minimum mandatory sentence on an aggravated 
sexual assault conviction not void for vagueness because "[i]t is ... plain from that statute 
that imposition of the sentence of highest severity is dependent upon a determination of 
the existence of aggravating circumstances, while imposition of the sentence of lowest 
severity is dependent upon a determination of the existence of mitigating 
circumstances."). 
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would be appropriate. A defendant convicted of aggravated murder would have no idea 
whether he would be sentenced to life without parole, or under which situations he would 
merit the possibility of parole. This statute carries significant danger that judges would 
fail to uniformly apply a consistent standard—because none exists. The danger is that the 
statute allows judges to arbitrarily sentence people to the second-most severe sentence—a 
sentence to die in prison—without any objective standard. 
2. Section 76-3-207.7 Violates Due Process, Equal Protection and 
the Uniform Operation of Laws 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee 
due process of law. "The sentencing phase of a criminal trial is a critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding, and a defendant is entitled to procedural protections to prevent any 
unfairness." State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349 (1977); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Lipsky, 608 
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)). The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all citizens equal 
protection of the law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Article I § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution requires "that the operation of the law be uniform." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 
991, 997 (Utah 1995) (emphasis in original) (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 
(Utah 1984)). According to this Court, Utah's uniform operation of laws provision, a law 
must not only be "uniform on its face," but it "is critical is that the operation of the law 
be uniform." Id. 
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This Court assesses equal protection challenges under the uniform laws provision 
with a three-prong test. 
First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory 
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on 
differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. 
Therefore, we must first determine what classifications, if any, are created by the 
statute. Second, we must determine whether different classes or subclasses are 
treated disparately. Finally, if any disparate treatment exists between classes or 
subclasses, we must determine whether the legislature had any reasonable 
objective that warrants the disparity. 
Mohi, 901 P.2d at 997 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Section 76-3-207.7 fails two prongs of this test because classes are treated 
differently and the legislature failed to define a reasonable objective with which to 
differentiate the classes. 
Section 76-3-207,7 creates two subclasses. In this case, the general class includes 
those found guilty of aggravated murder. The statute then creates two subclasses: (1) 
persons sentenced to the presumptive life without parole; and (2) persons sentenced to the 
lighter sentence of twenty-five years to life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7(2). 
Section 76-3-207.7 treats the subclasses disparately. In this case, as in Mohi, all 
offenders are convicted of an offense that is "statutorily indistinguishable." Mohi, 901 
P.2d at 998. Each offender sentenced under 76-3-207.7 will be convicted of aggravated 
murder, yet despite this common conviction, some in the class receive life without parole 
while others receive twenty-five years to life. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7(2). 
Section 76-3-207.7 lacks a reasonable objective to warrant disparate 
treatment. In Mohi, this Court recognized that in some situations there is a need to treat 
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subclasses differently, such as "trying certain violent juveniles as adults." Mohi, 901 P.2d 
at 999. In Mohi, however, as in this case, "the legislature has failed to identify which 
violent [offenders] require such treatment, instead delegating that discretion [without] ... 
guidelines as to how it is to be exercised." Id. (emphasis in original). In Mohi, the statute 
had "no standards" to guide decision making—its standards were "totally absent" and the 
statute was "wholly without standards to guide or instruct" the use of discretion. Id. 
(emphasis in original). "Legitimacy of a goal cannot justify an arbitrary means ... [and] 
cannot make up for a deficiency in its design." Id. 
Section 76-3-207.7 increases the likelihood of disparate treatment. It does not 
require a balance of aggravating and mitigating factors. It gives no guidelines to when 
twenty-five years to life might be the appropriate sentence. Because the statute fails to 
distinguish those who merit the harsher or lighter sentence, it violates equal protection, 
due process, and the uniform laws provision. 
The Statute Removes the Burden from the Jury, Additionally, the statute 
violates due process since it removes the question of deciding aggravating and mitigating 
factors from the jury and makes it a judicial question. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002) (jury must find the existence of aggravating factors necessary for death sentence); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any factor that enhances a person's 
potential sentence must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). Defendant 
argues the statute violates his right to have this punishment decided by the jury, since the 
sentence of life without parole constitutes an aggravating factor in sentencing. 
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B. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and Utah's Unnecessary 
Rigor Provision Prohibit Sentencing a 19-year old Offender with an 
IQ of 77 to Life Without Parole 
1. Sentencing a 19-year old With an IQ of 77 to Life Without Parole 
Violates Utah's Unnecessary Rigor Provision 
Unnecessary rigor provisions existed in state constitutions as early as 1796.77 
Utah's provision was adopted in 1896, about the time four other states adopted similar 
• 75? 
provisions. Unnecessary rigor provisions "came out of the Prison Reform Movement of 
the 1800s, whereby people sought to make prisons more humane."79 "[M]any states 
thought a commitment to humanizing penal laws and the treatment of offenders to rank 
with other principles of constitutional magnitude ..." Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 128 
(Ore. 1981). "Unnecessary rigor" does not focus on the "conditions of punishment," nor 
does it limit itself to shackles, balls and chains—the provision "protects persons charged 
with crime from ill or unjust treatment at all times." Id. at 129 (citing Bonahoon v. State, 
178 N.E. 570, 571 (Ind. 1931)). 
" Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 128 n. 11 (Ore. 1981) (citing Tenn Const 1796, art XI, 
§ 13 in volume 9 at 148 (1979)). See Richard S. Frase, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: 
Litigating Under the Eighth Amendment: Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under 
Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 39, 65 (2008). 
net 
"Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah 
Const, art I, § 9. The other four states use slightly different language: "No person 
arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Ind. Const, art. I, 
§ 15; Or. Const, art. I, § 13; Tenn. Const, art. I, § 13; Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 16. See Scott 
C. Sandberg, Developing Jurisprudence on the Unnecessary Rigor Provision of the Utah 
Constitution, 1996 UTAHL. REV. 751, 752-53 (1996). 
79
 Symposium, The Legal Status ofNonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 56 (2002). 
Unnecessary rigor provisions "reflect a widespread interest in penal reform in the states 
during the post-Revolutionary decades." Sterling, 625 P.2d at 128. Tennessee has 
interpreted the clause to require prisoners to be guaranteed safely and humane treatment. 
Raedle v. Townsend, 1987 WL 7721 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (Franks, J., concurring). 
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In Utah, the unnecessary rigor provision came at a time in which most Utahns 
exhibited vast frustrations with excessive criminal sentencing. Congress criminalized 
polygamy, resulting in the incarceration of thousands of Mormon men, many of whom 
O 1 
saw the criminalization and resulting penalties as particularly onerous. The federal 
government's "zealous enforcement" of polygamy prosecutions "led to allegations of 
disproportionate sentences for Mormon polygamists in comparison to criminals convicted 
of other crimes." James G. McLaren, The Meaning of the "Unnecessary Rigor" 
Provision in the Utah Constitution, 10 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 27, 34-35 (1996). Mormons' 
recent recollection of polygamy-based incarcerations "undoubtedly ... contributed to the 
early protections afforded convicts in Utah." Id. 
The memory of past injustices, real and perceived, may have influenced the 
Mormon delegates attending the constitutional convention to approve the inclusion 
of the unnecessary rigor clause. 
Id. at 39-40. 
Thomas Alexander, Mormonism in Transition: A History of the Latter-day Saints, 
1890-1930 (University of Illinois Press, 1986) at 6-15. Mormons were told in seeking 
statehood that "you are a mere handful of people; 150,000 against 50 or 60 millions, and 
those millions have made up their minds that polygamy shall be exterminated." Id. at 
129. See generally, Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and 
Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America, 222 (University of North 
Carolina Press. 2002); Edward Leo Lyman, Political Deliverance: The Mormon Quest 
for Utah Statehood (University of Illinois Press 1986); Gustive O. Larson, The 
Americanization of Utah for Statehood (Huntington Library 1971). 
81
 See James B. Hill, History of Utah State Prison 1850-1952, at 92 (1952) (unpublished 
M.S. thesis, Brigham Young University; Mormon Polygamy: A History. By Richard S. 
Van Wagoner. (Salt Lake City: Signature Books. Pp. 255. 1989.) at 115-23. Mormons 
remained defiant against anti-polygamy efforts: "Mormonism will never be destroyed 
until it is destroyed by the guns of the United States Government... with cannons of the 
biggest bore, thunder into them the seventh commandment" Id. at 116. 
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In interpreting Utah constitutional provisions, this Court has said that it looks first 
to the plain language of the constitutional text. American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 
2006 UT 40, If 10, 140 P.3d 1235. Beyond the language, the court should consider 
"historical evidence of the framers' intent" in "our state's particular traditions, and the 
intent of our constitution's drafters." Id. at Y|[ 11-12 (quoting West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994)). According to this Court, the unnecessary 
rigor provision "on its face" is "broader than" the Eighth Amendment and provides 
greater protections to defendants. Bishop, 111 P.2d at 267; State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 
Tf 73, 20 P.3d 342. Prisoners are protected against "unnecessary abuse" or "treatment that 
is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified ...." Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 737 
(Utah 1996); see also State v. M.L.C, 933 P.2d 380, 385 (Utah 1997) ("the clause applies 
to abusive treatment of prisoners or arrestees."). 
"The unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution protects persons arrested 
or imprisoned from the imposition of circumstances on them during their confinement 
that demand more of the prisoner than society is entitled to require." Dexter v. Bosko, 
2008 UT 29, Tf 17, 184 P.3d 592. The applicability of Utah's unnecessary rigor clause is 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at f^ 17; State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1990). The provision is "self-executing," meaning that it "prohibits specific evils that 
may be defined and remedied without implementing legislation." Bott, 922 P.2d at 737. 
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Utah's unnecessary rigor provision should be read to prohibit sending a young 
person of Mr. Perea's age, mental disabilities and IQ to prison for life. Mr. Perea makes 
this argument based on the scientific literature. 
Scientific Literature on Adolescence.82 The literature is replete with the fact that 
young people, even over age 18, are less likely to make mature judgments, are more 
vulnerable to negative influences, and are more likely to engage in risky or criminal 
behavior.83 Young people impulsively focus on short-term benefits,84 without much self-
control or focus on the long-term effects or consequences of their actions. 
82
 See State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451 (Wi. 2011) (amicus brief of the Wisconsin 
Psychiatric Association and the Wisconsin Psychological Association citing much of the 
research in this section). 
See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1015 (2003); Margo Gardner & Laurence 
Stienberg, Peer Influence on Risk taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in 
Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
625, 632 (2005); Thomas Grisso, Double Jeopardy: Adolescent Offenders with Mental 
Disorders 64-66 (2004); Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile 
Justice, 16 Ann. Rev. Clinical Psychol. 47, 57-61 (2009) [hereinafter Adolescent 
Development]', see also Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision 
Making as Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 Developmental 
Psychol. 193, 194(2010). 
Adolescent Development, supra note 83, at 57-58; Cauffman et al., supra note 83, at 
194; B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 65 (2008). 
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: 
Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 748-49, 
754 & tbl. 4 (2000) [hereinafter (Im)maturity of Judgment]; Laurence Steinberg et al., 
Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-
Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, AA DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774-
76 (2008). 
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Perhaps most significantly, a nineteen-year old's brain has not completely 
developed. Research has showed that a child's brain develops logical reasoning well 
before advanced emotional maturity, which occurs much later.87 The brain's frontal 
lobes, particularly its prefrontal cortex, enable higher-order cognitive functions88, such as 
information processing, decision-making, risk assessment, evaluation of consequences 
for actions, impulse control89, and moral judgments.90 However, the prefrontal cortex has 
been found to be one of the last areas of brain to fully mature.91 This development 
extends beyond adolescence and well into early adulthood. In other words, nineteen-
OS 
Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 
216-18 (2009); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development 
During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCE. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8177 
(2004); B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation 
to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 243 (2000). 
Laurence Steinberg, et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors' Access 
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop, " 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009). 
88
 Johnson et al., supra note 86, at 217; Eveline A. Crone et al., Neurocognitive 
Development of Relational Reasoning, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. 55, 56 (2009); Silvia A. 
Bunge et al., Immature Frontal Lobe Contributions to Cognitive Control in Children: 
Evidence from fMRI, 33 NEURON 301,301 (2002). 
89
 Laurence Steinberg, Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 
Child Development 28, 40 (2009); Elkhonon Goldberg, The New Executive Brain: 
Frontal Lobes in a Complex World 175 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
90
 Johnson et al., supra note 86, at 217; Antoine Bechara et al., Characterization of the 
Decision Making Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 
BRAIN 2189, 2198-2200 (2000); Judge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal 
Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in 
Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ NEUROSIQUIATR 657, 661-63 (2001). 
91
 Gogtay et al., supra note 86, at 8177. 
92
 Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents: 
Development of the Ventrolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortices, 45 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICA 1270, 1270 (2007); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence 
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year olds, categorically, have not completely developed those areas of the brain 
responsible for higher-level decision-making and impulse control. 
Not only has the brain not completely developed, but nineteen-year olds' 
personality traits have not yet stabilized.93 Emotional stability increases through 
adolescence, and conscientiousness continues to develop through college age young 
people.94 
However, Riqo was not a typical nineteen-year old. According to Dr. Houston, 
after administering the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, Riqo's age equivalent was age 
15 on one part and age 10 or 11 on the other. R. 1909:58. In fact, while Riqo is in an 
adult body, his brain has not developed beyond that of an eighteen-year old and he 
remains age 10-11 or age 15 in mind. "For instance, a person said to have the mental age 
of a five year-old scored roughly the same as the average five year-old who took the IQ 
Scientific Literature on IQs, ADHD and Potential Mental Retardation, "It is 
commonly agreed among criminologists that low IQ is a robust predictor of delinquency 
for Post Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859-60 (1999). 
Theo A. Klimstra et al., Maturation of Personality in Adolescence, 96 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 898, 906-08 (2009); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 83, at 1015; 
Robert R. McCrae, et al., Nature Over Nurture: Temperament, Personality and Life Span 
Development, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 173, 177-84 (2000). 
94
 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 83, at 1015; Daniel M. Blonigen, Explaining the 
Relationship Between Age and Crime: Contributions from the Developmental Literature 
on Personality, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 91-94 (2010). 
Joseph A. Nese, Jr., The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the 
Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 375 
(2002). 
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and criminality." There is a "remarkable" correlation between low IQ and violent 
behavior. However, a person with a low IQ, in a proper environment, can minimize or 
eliminate delinquent behavior.98 Low IQ evidence inherently mitigates criminal 
culpability: "we cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is not relevant 
mitigating evidence." Tennardv. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004). The mentally 
retarded or impaired lack impulse control and have difficulty correcting improper 
behavior. An innumerable body of scientific literature shows that the mentally retarded 
have a "reduced ability" to function.100 
J.C. Oleson, The Insanity of Genius: Criminal Culpability and Right-Tail 
Psychometrics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 587, 602 (2009); Geoffrey R. McKee, 
Competency to Stand Trial in Low-IQ Juveniles, 19 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3 
(1998); Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 13 (2007) 
(low IQs can "make unfortunate outcomes [such as delinquency] more likely."). 
David P. Farrington, Predictors, Causes, and Correlates of Male Youth Violence, 24 
CRIME & JUST. 421,444-45 (1998). 
Edward, Mulvey et al., Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency: A Review of the Research, 
4:2 THE PREVENTION RESEARCHER 1- 4, 2 (1997). 
99
 See, e.g., Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded From Capital 
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 80-81 (1996); Jamie Marie Billotte, Is it Justified?-The 
Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLfY 333, 
366-67 (1994). 
100
 See, e.g., AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of 
Supports (10th ed. 1999); Manual of Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental 
Retardation (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., 1996); Robert M. Hodapp, 
Jacob A. Burack, & Edward Zigler, Developmental Approaches to Mental Retardation: A 
Short Introduction, in Handbook of Mental Retardation and Development 3 (Jacob A. 
Burack, et al. eds., 1998); Thomas L. Whitman, Self-Regulation and Mental Retardation, 
94 AJ.M.R. 347 (1990) (impulse control); L.W. Heal & C.L. Sigelman, Response Biases 
in Interviews of Individuals with Limited Mental Ability, 39 INTELL. DISABILITY 
RESEARCH 331 (1995) (acquiescence); Edward Zigler & Robert M. Hodapp, Behavioral 
Functioning in Individuals with Mental Retardation, 42 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 29, 43 
(1991) (outer-directedness); Harvey N. Switzky, Mental Retardation and the Neglected 
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However, an IQ below 70 is not the only predictor of mental retardation because 
of problems in diagnosis, coupled with the standard error of measurement. The DSM-
IV-TR states that "it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals with IQs 
between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior."102 
Courts have found mentally retarded individuals among those with IQs above 70. 
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 925 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 2007) (Defendant had an IQ of 74 and 
"both parties agree that it is possible for a person with an IQ ranging from 70 to 75 to 
suffer from mental retardation, depending upon the degree of adaptive deficits," which in 
Construct of Motivation, 32 EDUC. AND TRAINING IN MENTAL RETARDATION AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 194 (1997) (extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation and 
relationship to social deprivation); Josephine C. Jenkinson, Factors Affecting Decision-
Making by Young Adults with Intellectual Disabilities, 104 A.J.M.R. 320 (1999) (learned 
helplessness); Judith Cockram, Robert Jackson & Rod Underwood, People with an 
Intellectual and Developmental Disability and the Criminal Justice System: The Family 
Perspective, 23 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 41 (1998) (propensity to hide 
disability). 
101
 AAIDD, User's Guide: Mental Retardation Definition, Classification and Systems of 
Supports 12 (10th ed. 2007) at 24 (stating that "IQ scores alone cannot precisely identify 
an individual's functioning in the upper boundary of mental retardation" suggesting an 
upper range of 75); accord Kay B. Stevens & J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental 
Retardation, and the Death Penalty, 6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1,21 (2006) 
("Limiting the determination of mental retardation to a specific IQ score is unacceptable 
due to multiple factors such as measurement error and cultural bias."). See also Richard J. 
Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How 
Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental 
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 836 (2007) ("[T]he SEM 
must always be taken into account when interpreting scores on IQ tests; failing to do so 
would be a clear departure from accepted professional practice in scoring and interpreting 
any kind of psychological test, including IQ tests."). 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 41 (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR) at 41-42 ("It should be noted that there is a 
measurement error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary 
from instrument to instrument (e.g., a Wechsler IQ of 70 is considered to represent a 
range of 65-75)."). 
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this case included "severe deficits" in academic and work skills, self-direction, coupled 
with an age equivalent of nine-years old); People v. Tulare County Superior Court, 155 
P.3d 259, 260-61 (CaL 2007) (trial court did not err in giving less weight to defendant's 
IQ of 84-92 and greater weight to other evidence of impaired intellectual functioning in 
finding mental retardation). In fact, because of the standard error of measurement "[i]n 
order to be highly confident that a person is not mentally retarded, therefore, an IQ score 
of at least 79 might be required, whereas a score of 76 might be required to rule out 
mental retardation if a somewhat lower level of confidence ('reasonable confidence') 
were acceptable."103 
Because Riqo Has the Potential to Reform and Change, a Sentence of Life 
Without Parole Violates Unnecessary Rigor. Character traits in teens are not stable 
predictors of their future behavior.104 In fact, the traits most associated with violent 
behavior have been shown to be extremely susceptible to positive changes as the teen 
matures. "[T]he vast majority of adolescents who engage in criminal or delinquent 
" Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. 
Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and 
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 
835 (2007). Bonnie & Gustafson also criticized the Supreme Court of Virginia for 
holding that because a particular defendant had IQ scores of 75 and 78, that he could not 
be mentally retarded, noting that without further study, this individual could meet the 
diagnostic criteria. Id, at 844-45. This standard can be even higher: the American 
Association of Mental Retardation says that an IQ of 70 indicates a range of 62 to 78. 
Am. Ass'n of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and 
Systems of Supports 57 (10th ed. 2002). In other words, given the standard error of 
measurement, Riqo Perea's IQ would fall anywhere between 69 to 85. 
104
 Daniel M. Blonigen, supra note 94, at 91. 
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behavior desist from crime as they mature" and expert psychologists lack the 
capabilities to concretely determine which juveniles will continue to engage in criminal 
behavior and which will not.106 As the Supreme Court said in Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005), "It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." 543 U.S. at 573. 
Perhaps the most problematic is the tendency to use a juvenile's crime as an 
indicator of an entrenched character and an impossibility for reform. However, the 
scientific literature almost completely rebuts such a claim: "The reality that juveniles still 
struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a 
heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character." 
Id. at 570. 
A sentence of life without parole is a death sentence for any offender—the young 
person will die in prison. This sentence is significantly graver for a young, rather than an 
older offender. "[Pjunishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is 
itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person" Id. at 571 (emphasis added). A 
sentence of life without parole guarantees society's lack of investment in the person. 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). "The State does not execute the 
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 83, at 1015; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-
Limited and LifeCourse-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 
Psychol. Rev. 674, 685-86 (1993). 
106
 Grisso, supra note 83, at 64-66. 
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offender sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender's life by a 
forfeiture that is irrevocable." Id. 
Utah's unnecessary rigor provision prohibits just such a scenario. While Riqo's 
chronological age was 19 at the time of the crime, his IQ puts him in the mental range of 
either a 15-year old or a 10 or 11 year-old. Additionally, given the standard error rate in 
IQ testing, Riqo could well suffer from actual mental retardation given his difficulties 
flinctioning in life. He has been diagnosed with ADHD, which untreated, can lead toward 
greater criminality. Riqo is a young offender—and one with mental illnesses—which 
minimizes his culpability over those of other offenders. 
Dr. Houston testified that Riqo could "be rehabilitated given proper program and 
sufficient length of time." R. 1928:96; 98. He testified using the scientific literature 
referenced here, that Riqo specifically could be rehabilitated. R. 1928:103-04. While a 
homicide may merit a life sentence without parole, Utah's unnecessary rigor provision 
would prohibit sentencing a young, mentally-ill offender to a lifetime of incarceration, 
especially given that there are substantial possibilities that at some point in his lifetime, 
Riqo may completely reform and no longer be a danger to society. 
2. Sentencing a 19-year old with an IQ of 77 to Life in Prison Violates 
the Federal Constitution 
In Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) the Supreme Court said that "[a]n 
offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail 
to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." 130 S. Ct. at 2031. 
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In addition, "the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits 
vague statutes ... ." State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, % 22, 174 P.3d 628. 
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender to death. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In 
Graham, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits sentencing a juvenile 
to life without parole for a non-homicide crime. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Both Roper and 
Graham relied on the scientific literature about young people's capacities. Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569-75; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. The Court emphasized that juveniles 
have "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," that juveniles 
are "more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure," and that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed." 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
Recognizing the fundamental differences between adults and juveniles, the Court 
held that juveniles are less culpable and less deserving of the most severe punishments. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. The Court also acknowledged that 
"'a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.'" 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). Additionally, the 
Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that States could not execute those who have 
IQs of 70 or less because they 
have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 
There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than 
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I 
others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than 
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers 4 
rather than leaders. 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). Executing the mentally retarded would also 
not deter crime, since these offenders have a "diminished ability to understand and ( 
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to 
control impulses — that also make it less likely that they can process the information of 
the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon 
that information." Id. at 320. 
For the reasons stated in the section on unnecessary rigor, the Eighth Amendment 
also prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. Sentencing a young offender, with a 
potential IQ in the mental retardation range, to life in prison constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. A mentally-challenged 19-year old's immaturity, vulnerability, impetuosity, 
and undeveloped character make him less culpable than an adult with a fully developed 
brain and values system. These deficits undermine every penological basis for imposing 
the most severe sentencing option currently available for juveniles: life without parole 
does not deter, facilitate retribution, or promote public safety any more than would an 
indeterminate sentence of life with parole. Especially troublesome about sentencing a 
juvenile to die in prison is the hopelessness exacerbated by the juvenile's lessened 
culpability, and lack of life experience to make sense of it all - in addition to the stark 
reality that a juvenile's life sentence is likely to be longer than an adult's. 
98 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
VII. A COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE ERRORS CONSTITUTES 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Cumulative error warrants reversal where "the cumulative effect of the several 
errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had."' State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35,125, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)); Gallegos, 
2009 UT 42, % 39, 220 P.3d 136 (requiring reversal for cumulative error where "the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had"). 
"In assessing a cumulative error claim, 'we consider all the identified errors, as well as 
any other errors we assume may have occurred/" Kohl at f^ 25 (quoting Dunn at 1229). It 
may be reached because the defendant faces a long term of imprisonment. Cobo, 60 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah 1936). 
The errors in this case were numerous and substantial, effectively denying Mr. 
Perea a fair trial. Mr. Perea was prevented from presenting two key aspects of his 
defense: computer animations and key forensic testimony establishing the existence of a 
second shooter and testimony in support of false confessions. Mr. Perea was also 
prohibited from presenting critical testimony from witnesses who, fearing for their safety, 
wished to testify anonymously that Riqo was not the shooter. 
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i 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Perea asks this Court to reverse his conviction and to remand 
for a new trial. 
i 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1'-> day of September, 11. 
IE ^ 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SAMUEL P. NEWTON, hereby certify that I have caused to be deposited in the United 
States mail ten copies of the foregoing and an electronic CD of the foregoing to the Utah 
Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 140210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
0210, and two copies and an electronic CD to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber 
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Third Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0854, this / j day of September, 11. 
c Of t4Qr 
SAMUEL P.' NEWTON ~ 
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing and an electronic CD containing the 
foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Attorney General's Office as 
indicated above this (0 day of September, 11. 
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